本文以賽局理論之均衡與策略聯盟概念探討臺灣與日本鮪釣漁業在生產與消費市 場上的互補與競爭關係，並針對臺灣鮪釣漁業之發展提供建議，研究結果指出臺灣業者採用 權宜船輸日的因應策略下，目前日本單獨對臺灣鮪釣漁業輸日設限的管制措施完全失效。在 此管制措施無法達成其目的的情況下，日本可能採取之政策為除本國外，對所有國家輸日設 限。一旦該政策付之實施，根據數值模擬之結果，臺灣鮪釣漁業之利潤將財現有之 286.8 億日圓下降至 177.3 億日圓，其影響不可謂不大。對應此可能的未來衝擊，本文亦建議相 關單位應充分利用國際任漁業制的趨勢，推動聯盟下的全面管制措施。一旦此全面管制措施 實現，數值模擬結果證實臺灣與日本鮪釣漁業的產業利潤均較現況為高。只要有完善的監督 機制，經過協商的管制措施將使兩國的鮪釣漁業獲利。另就消費者的立場而言，聯盟雖將導 致魚價上漲，而使其（短期）消費者剩餘下降。長期而言，聯盟卻可因捕獲量之減少而增進 鮪魚資源的永續利用。在魚源不虞匱乏的情況下，不但可減少鮪魚長期價格上漲的壓力，更 可防止魚價大幅波動的可能性，消費者即可因而獲致長期的效益。

　　　　　By applying the concepts of equilibrium and strategic alliance from game theory, this paper analyzes the interactions between tuna long liners industries of Taiwan and of Japan. Firstly, the research results indicate that the Japanese partially import quota control to Taiwan was ineffective because the fishing companies of Taiwan had changed flags for convenience. Knowing the futility of the control, the authority of Japan could adopt the "Japan exclusive import quota control" which would cause the total profit of the industry of Taiwan to be down from 28.68 billion yen to 17.73 billion yen, Corresponding to such a shock, if suggests the authority of Taiwan pursue the overall import quota control (inclding Japan). The quota can be set according to the collusion outcomes. As the (Short-term) quantity is reduced, the implementation of the outcome compiles the spirit of international Code of Conduct of Responsible Fishing. By doing numerical simulation, it is also able to verify that the industry profits of both countries are raised under the overall import quota control given the conducts of fishing companies is well monitored. On the other hand, the consumers' surplus is lower in the short run. Nonetheless, as the reduction of current quantity implies the abundance of resource in the future, the future prices will be lower and the long-term consumers' surplus will be increased.