本文視銀行的資產組合決策為內生變數，探討銀行擁有特許權價值時的資產組合政策，並導出存在道德危險問題時之最適銀行停業策略。我們證明要求銀行持有更高資產對存款負債比例，不一定能降低銀行資產組合風險。在銀行僅可從事淨現值等於零的投資活動時，提高其資產對存款負債比例故可減少銀行持有風險性資產之誘因；但當銀行擁有淨現值為正之投資機會時，反而將增加銀行風險性資產之持有比例。其次，最適銀行停業策略須視個別銀行與管制者目標而異。當管制者追求成本極小化時，應對擁有高特許權價值之銀行延後命令停業時機-即要求較低的臨界資產對存款負債比例；但當管制者追求社會福利極大化時，卻該對擁有高特許權價值之銀行採行更嚴格的停業策略，要求較高的臨界資產對存款負債比例。再者，不論管制目標為何，管制者均應於存款保險費率增加時，提高銀行的臨界資產對存款負債比例。

　　　　　The paper, given the bank's investment decision endogenous, examines the risk-taking behavior of banks and derives the optimal closure/reorganization policies whenever the moral hazard problem is present. We demonstrate the more stringent capital regulation even leads to an increase in the bank's asset risk if the bank can investment in non-zero net present value projects. Moreover, we show that the optimal closure/reorganization policy is bank-specific and depends on the objective of regulator. The regulator can minimize reorganization cost by delaying the closure of a bank with a larger charter value. However, for a welfare-maximizing regulator, the optimal time when the bank must be closed should be earlier if the bank's charter value is larger. In addition, no matter what the regulator's objective is, the regulator who tries to charge a higher deposit insurance premium must simultaneously raise the threshold assets-to-deposits ratio below which a bank should be optimally closed.