本文綜合新制度經濟學和國家理論，論證中國大陸在準備根本「不變革」政治規 則，僅僅在「實現公有制多樣化」的範圍內，乃至仍然高舉「四個堅持」的框架下，進行 實質上不過是「產權修正」的局部補修，將無法徹底達到改造國有企業的目標。一種「以 不觸動公有體制為前提」的改革，也不能導致有效率的產權改革。本文試圖證明，「增量 －漸進」改革模式實際上是這種「低效改革」的理論概括。本文通過「國家障礙」－泛宏 觀調控論、產權殘缺、僵持性談判、政治軟約束－四個類型，論證了作為國家暴力潛能之 一的「合法性潛能」（legitimacy potential），正是國有企業改革的最大障礙。

　　　　　This thesis synthesizes the economic theory of New Institutionalism and State theory to argue that the Mainland China still exerts its political rule of being "unwilling to change." From the limited sphere of "carrying out the diversity within a state-owned system" to its persistent and high-sounding framework of "Four Insistences," infact Mainland China engages in a partial amendment of "estate correction," a correction that fails to achieve the goal of a total reform in the state-owned enterprise sector. A reformation with a premise of being unable to alter the state-owned system will lead to an ineffective reform of property rights and will be destined to fail. This paper also attempts to prove that the reformative mode of a "gradual- increase" is the theoretical generalization of this "low-effective reform." Moreover, this thesis will present four types of "State Barriers" - generalized macro control, absence of property rights, deadlocked negotiations, and political soft constraints - to reason that the "legitimate violent potential" as one of the state violent potentials turns out to be the greatest obstacle to the reformation of the stated-owned enterprise.