在本卜大中我們證明在訊息不對稱的情況下，若加上經理人固守職位的考量，則 經理人選擇權益融資將成為一個均衡的行為。而在某特定環境下，亦可導出部份分離解，即 有能力且低轉換成本的經理人將選擇負債融資，有能力且高轉換成本與低能力的經理人將選 擇權益融資。這些行為的基本誘因是經理人選擇負債融資是為了利益的分享，選擇權益融資 是為了固守職位。同時，我們發現經理人所握有的股權亦會影響資本結構的選擇，並可尋得 一個股權比例，使得經理人對固守職位與利益分享呈現無差異。最後在結論中，就整個分析 對實證的涵義作一說明。

　　　　　In this paper, we demonstrate that information asymmetries within a firm along with managerial entrenchment concerns can jointly result in equity finance at the equilibrium. Under some specific circumstances, a partially separating equilibrium is obtained. That is, talented managers with low relocation cost will choose debt finance, talented managers with high relocation and untalented managers will choose equity finance. The basic motivation for these behaviors is that managers choose debt finance for profit sharing and managers choose equity finance in order to entrench themselves. Further, we find managers' ownership share will affect the choice of capital structure. A proportion of management ownership can be found at which managers are indifferent about whether to entrench themselves or share profits. Finally, we present several empirical implications of our analysis.