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題名:臺灣地區創業投資公司投資行為之研究--以「聲譽模式」為分析架構
書刊名:輔仁管理評論
作者:許培基陳隆麒謝劍平
作者(外文):Shu, Pei-giChen, Long-chieShieh, Joseph. C. P.
出版日期:1999
卷期:6:2
頁次:頁71-99
主題關鍵詞:創業投資聲譽模式Venture capitalReputation model
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(3) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:3
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:19
     本研究以聲譽模式為理論分析架構,研究臺灣地區的創業投資公司在資金籌募與 追逐聲譽的壓力下所呈現躁進的投資行為。模型的建構以聲譽模型為基礎,在假設創投後期 籌募金額大小為聲譽的線性函數下,聲譽不明確的創投為追逐短期聲譽績效而傾向提前將被 投資公司輔導上市,以爭取短期的聲譽績效;然提前上市的公司會因為市場資訊不對稱而提 高股價被低估的機率,因此,創投在權衡短期聲譽績效與股價被低估成本的雙重考量下,決 定其投資行為的模式。本研究蒐集從民國81年至85年創投投資的明細資料,並以創投經理 人年資與創投年資作為聲譽的代理變數,在控制市場、產業、與公司相關變數下,觀察創投 聲譽對其投、融資行為的影響。本研究以創投第一次投資到上市(櫃)的時間間距、被投資公 司的年齡、創投出脫持股的幅度、上市到籌措下一次基金的時間間距、以及下一次籌措基金 的金額等作為創投投、融資行為的代理變數。實證的結果發現,創投的年資顯著與第一次投 資到上市(櫃)的時間間距以及被投資公司的年齡正相關,而與創投出脫持股的幅度負相關; 創投經理人的年資與被投資公司上市(櫃)後到下一次資金籌募的時間間距顯著正相關,因 此,創投為追逐聲譽躁進投資的假說得到驗證。
     We use reputation model to depict the grandstanding behavior of Taiwan's venture capitalist under the pressure of funding and reputational concerns. Model was under the building block to assume that the size of next funding of venture capitalist was proportional to the reputation presented in the current period. For those venture capitalists with blurred reputation are prone to bring premature start-up companies to IPO to pursue the short performance, while the grandstanding behavior would enhance the probability of underpricing the newly issued stocks since the asymmetry in information between investors and start-up companies. The venture capitalists will trade off the benefit and cost in reputation sought behavior. We collect the data of long-term investment of those public venture capital companies from 1992-1996 for empirical test. The age of venture capital company as well as the age of manager were served as the proxy variables for reputation. We observe the reputation effect on four proxy variables for investment and funding behaviors. They are the time from first investment to IPO, the age of start-up company, selling the shares of IPO company, and the time from IPO to next funding. The empirical result shows that the age of venture capital company is positively related to the time from first investment to IPO and the age of start-up company; while the age of manager of venture capital company is positively related to the time from IPO to next funding. The result verifies the reputation hypothesis.
期刊論文
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2.Hirshleifer, D.、Thakor, A. V.(1992)。Managerial conservatism, project choice, and debt。Review of Financial Studies,5(3),437-470。  new window
3.Hirshleifer, D.(1993)。Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions。Financial Management,22(2),145-160。  new window
4.Brennan, M. J.、Copeland, T. E.(1988)。Stock Splits, Stock Prices and Transaction Costs。Journal of Financial Economics,22(1),83-101。  new window
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6.Gompers, P.、Lerner, J.(1996)。The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements。Journal of Law and Economics,39,463-498。  new window
7.Mundlak, Y.(1978)。On The Pulling of Time Series and Cross Section Data。Econometrica,46,69-85。  new window
8.Vermaelen, T.(1984)。Repurchase Tender Offers, Signaling, and Managerial Incentives。Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,19,163-181。  new window
9.Stein, J. C.(1989)。Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopia of Myopic Corporate Behavior。Quarterly Journal of Economics,104(4),655-669。  new window
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11.Gompers, P. A.(1996)。Grandstanding in the venture capital industry。Journal of Financial Economics,42(1),133-156。  new window
12.Hirshleifer, D.、Suh, Y.(1992)。Risk, Managerial Effort, and Project Choice。Journal of Financial Intermediation,2(3),308-345。  new window
13.Narayanan, M. P.(1985)。Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results。Journal of Finance,40(5),1469-1486。  new window
14.Admati, Anat R.、Pfleiderer, Paul(1994)。Robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists。Journal of Finance,49(2),371-402。  new window
15.Gompers, P. A.(1995)。Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital。Journal of Finance,50(5),1461-1489。  new window
16.Gibbons, R.、Murphy, K. J.(1992)。Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence。Journal of Political Economy,100(3),468-505。  new window
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18.Lee, Charles M. C.、Shleifer, Andrei、Thaler, Richard H.(1991)。Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle。The Journal of Finance,46(1),75-109。  new window
19.Megginson, William L.、Weiss, Kathleen A.(1991)。Venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings。Journal of Finance,46(3),879-903。  new window
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研究報告
1.Hirshleifer, D.、Chordia, T.(199110)。Resolution Preference and Project Choice。Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California。  new window
學位論文
1.Yoo, D.(1987)。Signalling Through Share Repurchase(博士論文)。University of California,Berkeley。  new window
 
 
 
 
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