預算制度是管理會計控制系統中的重要工具，而在設定預算目標時，經理人常將 寬列混入預算中而影響預算制度之有效運作。為了避免預算寬列，最常被用來作研究分析的 是誘導實情獎酬制度。此制度雖能有效減少預算寬列，卻無法根絕寬列的存在。本文認為關 鍵在於獎酬制度中之參數設計不當，以致無法發揮誘導實情的功能。本研究採不確定情況下 之決策理論模型大中取小 (Minimax) 法， 探討誘導實情獎酬制度中之參數、風險偏好和預 算寬列之間的關係，並指出制度中之參數關係是決定預算寬列的一個重要因素，若設計不當 將失去誘導實情的確實功效。此結果可作為實務上設計獎酬契約時之參考。

　　　　　The budget system is one of the important tools in the management accounting control system. However, in the budget goal setting process, budgeting managers may insert slack into their budget. Budget slack will erode the effectiveness of the budget system. Agency researchers recognize that well-designed contracts can be used to solve this incentive problem. Therefore, truth-inducing schemes are widely discussed and analyzed. However, many empirical studies report that such schemes can decrease slack, but not eliminate it completely. This study points out that the parameters of the schemes are not well-designed, therefore, the effectiveness to induce subordinates to disclose private information is of failure. This paper analyses the relationship among parameters of the truth-inducing pay scheme, risk preference and budget slack by Minimax law under uncertainty, and points that this scheme will lose its effectiveness under some condition. At the meanwhile, this thesis also explains how to design a compensation contract to provide a reference for practical application.