本文基于公司違規視角檢驗了兩類官員型獨立董事的監督功能。研究發現,聘任政府官員型獨立董事的公司違規傾向更高,違規被稽查的概率更低;聘任高校官員型獨立董事的公司違規傾向更低,違規被稽查的概率沒有表現更低。進一步還發現,對公司過度投資發揮監督功能是官員型獨董影響違規的重要傳導路徑;政府官員型獨董背后的尋租能力是其監督失效的主要原因,而高校官員型獨董則憑借其專業優勢發揮了積極的監督作用。本文的經驗證據表明,"18號文"的政策沖擊導致的官員型獨董的離職,一方面切斷了公司通過聘任政府官員擔任獨立董事而建立政治關系的通道,有利于證券市場秩序的維護,但同時也將部分能夠發揮積極監督作用的高校官員型獨董排除在外。

This paper investigates the monitoring role of independent directors with official background through corporate fraud and finds that,(1)Firms that hire government officials as independentdirectors are more likely to commit fraud but less likely to been detected;(2)Firms that hire university officials as independent directors are less likely to commit fraud but the probability of fraud detection is not lower.Further study shows the monitoring effect on overinvestment is the main conduction path through which directors with official background affect corporate fraud;rent-seeking function of government officials disables monitoring effects while university officials monitor effectively because of professional advantages.Our study shows that the dismission of official independent directors caused by the exogenous shock of"No.18 Document"cuts off political connections and maintains security market order,but also rules out those who can positively monitor firms.