基于審計署2010-2014年公布的中央企業財務收支和專項調查審計公告,我們以被審計中央企業的控股上市公司為檢驗樣本,通過傾向值得分配對(PSM)方法確定其配對樣本,考察被審樣本公司在國家審計前后過度投資水平的變化。通過研究發現,國家能夠抑制公司過度投資行為,但與一次審計相比,二次審計對過度投資沒有顯著影響。在區分會計師事務所規模后,我們發現,在一次審計中,國家審計對投資過度的抑制作用主要體現在非"十大"的小所審計的公司中,而對大所審計的公司無顯著影響。在二次審計中,國家審計能夠進一步抑制小所審計公司的過度投資行為。上述研究發現對理解國家審計之于國有企業的監督作用具有重要意義。

Based on government audit reports issued by China National Audit Office(NAO)from 2010 to 2014,we use listed subsidiaries of audited central enterprises as the sample to examine whether government audit has effects on firms’investment efficiency.We apply Propensity Score Method(PSM)and Difference-inDifference(DID)research design to control for the potential endogenous problems,and use the model proposed in Richardson(2006)to measure investment efficiency.We find that government audit can significantly restrain the overinvestment behavior in SOEs,especial in companies whose financial reports legally audited by non-Big 10 audit firms.We also find that the second round government audit has no further influence on overinvestment behavior,compared with the first round government audit.But regression results group by audit firm size show that he second round government audit has further influence on overinvestment behavior in companies audited by non-Big 10 audit firms.Our study provides empirical evidence on the effects of government audit on investment efficiency in SOEs.