本文以2006-2013年我國A股上市公司為樣本,以企業總部所在省份的省委書記變更作為政治不確定性的衡量,研究了政治不確定性對于管理層自愿業績預告和預告精確度的影響。結果發現,在官員變更的當年,管理層會更傾向于自愿發布業績預告,并且業績預告的精確度也會提高。進一步研究發現,政治不確定性對業績預告自愿披露傾向和精確度的影響在民營企業、新任官員為外部調任時、分析師跟蹤人數更多的公司中更為顯著。最后本文也從資本市場反應的角度進行了補充檢驗,發現市場在政治不確定性更高時對業績預告的反應也更強烈。本文的發現對于理解政治不確定性的微觀影響及管理層自愿業績預測的作用都有一定的貢獻。

This paper examines the effect of political uncertainty on voluntary management earnings forecasts. Using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2013,we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and increase earnings forecasts precision after the turnoverof Provincial Party Secretary. The effect is more pronounced for Non-State Owned Enterprises,when the new official comes from other provinces,or for firms with more analyst coverage. Further analysis shows that the market reaction to earnings forecasts is stronger when political uncertainty is high. Our study sheds light on the real effects of political uncertainty and contributes to the understanding of voluntary management earnings forecast behaviors.