區域內地方政府合作是解決跨界環境污染的重要途徑,我國現行環境管理體制決定了任期長短對地方政府是否環境合作具有重要影響。基于博弈論分析方法,針對地方政府任期對區域環境合作的穩定性影響進行了理論分析。首先,分析了完全信息靜態博弈時兩個地方政府非合作與合作情形下的均衡污染排放量,構建基于無限次重復博弈模型并討論兩個地方政府采取冷酷戰略時彼此合作的臨界貼現因子。然后,基于有限次重復博弈模型討論了臨界貼現因子與任期長短的關系。研究發現,貼現因子高于臨界水平是地方政府選擇環境合作的必要條件;而地方政府的任期越長則臨界貼現因子越小,地方政府之間環境合作穩定性越強。基于此,提出了地方政府任期及環境保護終身追責等促進區域環境合作的建議。

The cooperation among local governments is an important way to solve the trans-boundary pollution problem which troubles China seriously. The current Chinese environmental management system determines that the tenure of local government has important implications for environmental cooperation. This study theoretically analyzes the relationship between the government term and the stability of regional environmental cooperation based on game theory. First,the equilibrium amounts of pollutant emission are analyzed based on two complete information static game models in cases of regional cooperation and noncooperation separately. And then,the critical discount factor of regional environmental cooperation is discussed based on infinitely repeated dynamic game with regions taking the grim strategy. Furthermore,the relationship between critical discount factor of regional environmental cooperation and government term is researched based on the finitely repeated game model. It shows that,discount factor above the critical level is the necessary requirement for regional environmental cooperation. The longer the term of government is,the smaller the critical discount factor of regional environmental cooperation is,and the greater the likelihood of regional environmental cooperation is. Based on this,we put forward some suggestions to promote regional environmental cooperation about the tenure of local government and lifelong responsibility of environmental protection.