在考慮產品回收再制造的閉環供應鏈中,原始制造商如何應對外部再制造商的競爭威脅是其面臨的重要決策問題。針對由制造商和再制造商組成的兩周期閉環供應鏈系統,在兩種競爭模式(具有專利授權機制的競爭模式以及無專利授權機制的競爭模式)以及合作模式下探討了制造商和再制造商的最優博弈策略。運用逆向歸納法推導和比較三種決策模式下的產品價格,給出再制造商從事回收再制造的臨界條件,結合數值算例分析消費者偏好對均衡解及渠道成員利潤的影響。研究表明:(1)從環境績效的角度分析,無專利授權競爭模式下的回收率最高,其次是合作模式,最低是具有專利授權的競爭模式,三種模式下的舊產品回收率均隨消費者偏好的增加而增加;(2)從渠道效率的角度分析,合作模式下的閉環供應鏈系統總利潤最高,其次是具有專利授權的競爭模式,最低的是無專利授權競爭模式。無專利授權競爭模式下的渠道總利潤隨消費者偏好的增加而減少,其他兩種模式下的渠道總利潤隨消費者偏好的增加而增加;(3)從原始制造商的角度分析,當其可利用再制造專利授權機制保障自身利益時,并無動機與再制造商進行合作;相反,當制造商不具備專利授權保障時,其愿意與再制造商合作,但再制造商利潤又將比合作前受損,因此需提供合理的契約機制確保合作模式的有效實施。本文研究結論可為現實中制造商合理選擇與再制造商的競爭與合作策略提供理論支持。

In s closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)with collection and remanufacturing of old products,how to deal with the competitive threat from the external remanufacturer is an important issue for the original equipment manufacturer(OEM).For a two-period CLSC system comprised of an OEM and an independent remanufacturer,the optimal game strategies of both parties are discussed under three different decision structures:two types of competitive mode(competition with remanufacturing patent licensing and competition without remanufacturing patent licensing)and cooperative mode.In all three modes,the OEM produces and sells the new products in the first period.For the competitive mode with patent licensing,the remanufacturer collects and remanufactures the EOL products after the OEM’s patent authorization in the second period,and then sells them in the market competing with the OEM.Otherwise,under the competitive mode without patent licensing,the remanufacturer can engage in these activities without the OEM’s authorization.For the cooperative mode,the remanufacturer transfers the remanufactured products to the OEM,and then the OEM sells the two kinds of products simultaneously.Backward deduction method is used to derive and compare the optimal prices under the above three modes.The condition under which the remanufacturer engages in collection and remanufacturing is given.The impact of consumer preference for the remanufactured products on the equilibrium solutions and the profits of channel members are analyzed combined with numerical examples.The results show that:(1)From the perspective of environmental performance,the collection rate under the competitive mode without patent licensing is the highest,and then is the cooperative mode,the lowest is the competitive mode with patent licensing.The collection rates under all three modes increase in the consumer preference.(2)From the perspective of channel efficiency,the cooperative mode yields the highest system profit,and then is the competitive mode with patent licensing,the worst is the competitive mode without patent licensing.The total system profit under the competitive mode without patent licensing decreases in the consumer preference,whereas increases in the consumer preference in two other modes.(3)From the perspective of the OEM,he has no motive to cooperate with the remanufacturer if he can take advantage of the patent licensing mechanism to guarantee his own interest.On the contrary,he prefers to cooperate with the remanufacturer without patent licensing,but which meanwhile leads to the profit loss of the remanufacturer.So the reasonable contact should be provided to ensure the operations the cooperative mode.The conclusion of this paper can provide theoretical supports for the OEM to select reasonable competitive strategies or cooperative strategies with the remanufacturer in reality.