在靜態和動態碳減排獎勵與懲罰機制下,考慮碳排放約束的地方政府和企業群體行為的演化博弈,重點分析了碳配額、碳交易價格、政府監督成本和企業減排投資(減排效果參數)對演化穩定策略(ESS)的影響,最后進行了算例分析。研究結果表明:在動態獎勵與懲罰機制下,地方政府和企業的演化軌跡圍繞著唯一的演化穩定策略螺旋趨近。碳配額對地方政府監督策略的作用與企業單位減排量市場收益的大小有關,政府監督成本和減排效果參數對地方政府監督策略起負向作用;政府監督成本對企業誠實減排策略起負向作用。隨著碳交易價格的不斷上升,地方政府監督的積極性先增加后降低,企業碳交易行為由購入碳排放權轉為出售碳排放權,但是地方政府監督行為的轉變滯后于企業減排行為的轉變。研究結果對碳交易體系下政府減排策略制定和企業減排投資具有較強啟示。

In the process of carbon emission mitigation,as two major participants of emission mitigation,government and enterprise play crucial roles,and subsidy and punishment are two key methods of government.However,the objectives of government and enterprise are not consistent and there exists a game between these two participants in the implementation of carbon emission mitigation.It is critical to handle correctly the contradiction between the government and enterprises.Considering that evolutionary game theory is an effective method in the research of this contradiction,an evolutionary game model is constructed in this paper under the mechanism of static and dynamic subsidy or punishment by local government.Four Influencing paramenters,including carbon allowance,carbon trading price,goveornmental supervision fee and enterprice abatement invest(emission reduction effect paramenter),are compared for their contributions to the evolutionarily stable strategy.The results show that:(1)under the mechanism of dynmaic subsidy or punishment,the trajectory of evolutionary game,cycles around and approach spirally the only evolutionarily stable strategy,is less influenced by the original states of local governments and enterprises.(2)Both the governmental supervision fee and enterprice abatement investment have a negative effect on the action tactics of government supervision.(3)The the impact of carbon allowance on government is relate to the per unit of emission redcution market returns.(4)With the increase of governmental supervision fee,the level of honestly reducing emission will reduce.(5)As carbon trading prices rising,the positivity of government supervision increases initially and then decreases,the actions of enterprise carbon trading vary from buying to selling carbon emission rights,but the transition of the governmental supervision actions lag behind the change of enterprise carbon trading behavior.Furthermore,according to the request of model and the actual environment of carbon market in China,an analysis about all parameters’ influence on evolutionarily stable strategy is made.The conclusions provide useful managerial implications for local governments to make policies,and enterprises to invest about reducing emission under the carbon trading mechanism.