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題名:個人求助網絡募捐模式下的網絡輿情博弈策略研究
書刊名:情報科學
作者:張琳楊尊琦
出版日期:2017
卷期:2017(10)
頁次:79-87+166
主題關鍵詞:個人求助網絡募捐演化博弈演化穩定策略Individual helpOnline donationEvolutionary gameEvolutionary stable strategy
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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【目的/意義】個人求助網絡募捐模式下網絡輿情演變各階段參與主體的認知和利益訴求的差異會影響其行為策略選擇,利用演化博弈理論可以從根本上分析輿情的形成與演化動因。【方法/過程】以羅爾事件為例,在動態演化博弈模型基礎上探究網絡輿情形成、發展、控制三階段多方參與主體的演化穩定策略選擇,并對網絡輿情的演變提出合理的指導意見。【結果/結論】根據博弈結果可知:受助人聯合企業發布虛假求助信息、網民采取捐助是網絡輿情形成階段的演化穩定策略;事件內情的曝光,網民總體傾向質疑使網絡輿情進一步發酵,此時政府的有效干預與相關責任方合理解釋有利于控制輿情的波動,使公眾利益得到補償,從而緩解輿情的負面影響
【Purpose/significance】The choice of behavior strategy will be affected by participants’ cognition and interests differences in every network public opinion evolution stage under the mode of individual help for online donation.The formation and evolution causes of public opinion can be fundamentally explored through the evolutionary game theory method.【Method/process】The rolle events is given as an example, participants’ evolutionary stable strategies in the three phases such as formation, development and control of network public opinion is explored by dynamic evolution game model, respectively, the corresponding guidance of network public opinion evolution is put forward by combining with the case.【Result/conclusion】According to the results of the game, we can see that the joint venture recipients’ activities of issuing false information for help, as well as the donation by the Internet users are the evolutionary strategy for the formation of the network public opinion. The exposure of the incident,and the overall tendency of the Internet users’ oppugn will further enrich the public opinion,which can be controlled by the government’s effective intervention and relevant responsible party’s reasonable explanation,and the public interest gets compensation,resultly the negative impact of public opinion can be alleviated.
期刊論文
1.Hirshleifer, D.、Teoh, S. H.(2003)。Herd Behavior and cascading in capital markets: a review and synthesis。European Financial Management,9(1),25-66。  new window
2.曾潤喜(2009)。網絡輿情管控工作機制研究。圖書情報工作,53(18),79-82。  延伸查詢new window
3.史波(2010)。公共危機事件網絡輿情內在演變機理研究。情報雜誌,29(4),41-45。  延伸查詢new window
4.Sznajd, J. N. K.(2000)。Opinion evolution in closed community。International Journal of Modern Physics,11(6),1157-1165。  new window
5.賓寧、楊樹標、胡鳳(2017)。突發事件網絡輿情演化的博弈分析--以茂名PX事件為例。情報探索,2017(1),32-39。  延伸查詢new window
6.姜勝洪(2010)。網絡輿情形成與發展規律研究。蘭州學刊,2010(5),77-79。  延伸查詢new window
7.王澍賢、陳福集(2016)。意見領袖參與下微博輿情演化的三方博弈分析。圖書館學研究,2016(1),19-25。  延伸查詢new window
8.Weisbuch, G.(2004)。Bounded confidence and social networks。The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems,38(2),339-343。  new window
9.孫逸嘯(2017)。網絡輿情與司法行為的博弈分析。法制與經濟,2017(4),120-124。  延伸查詢new window
10.王旭、孫瑞英(20170300)。基於SNA的突發事件網絡輿情傳播研究--以「魏則西事件」為例。情報科學,2017(3),87-92。new window  延伸查詢new window
11.祁凱、楊志、張子墨、劉巖芳(20170300)。政府參與下網民輿論引導機制的演化博弈分析。情報科學,2017(3),47-52。new window  延伸查詢new window
12.姜珊珊(2010)。非常規突發事件網絡輿情中的意見領袖分析。情報理論與實踐,2010(12),101-104。  延伸查詢new window
13.韓少春、劉雲、張彥超(2011)。基於動態演化博弈論的輿論傳播羊群效應。系統工程學報,26(2),275-281。  延伸查詢new window
14.張立凡、程楠、朱恒民(20170100)。基於動態博弈的媒體參與下網絡輿情機制分析。情報科學,2017(1),144-147+152。new window  延伸查詢new window
15.李林(2014)。基於社會網絡衝突信息傳播的群體特徵。系統工程理論與實踐,34(1),208-214。  延伸查詢new window
16.楊尊琦、張琳(2016)。網絡多方衝突演化博弈行為策略研究。情報雜誌,35(7),86-94。  延伸查詢new window
17.宋彪、朱建明、黃啟發(2014)。基於群集動力學和演化博弈論的網絡輿情疏導模型。系統工程理論與實踐,2014(11),2984-2994。  延伸查詢new window
學位論文
1.方付建(2011)。突發事件網絡輿情演變研究(博士論文)。華中科技大學,武漢。  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.威布爾、王永欽(2006)。演化博弈論。上海:上海人民出版社。  延伸查詢new window
其他
1.(20170314)。個人求助式眾籌如何才能不傷害公眾的愛心?,http://www.xincainet.com/wap/index.php/news/view?id=179622。  延伸查詢new window
2.胡玲玲(20161205)。近年來網絡詐捐事件盤點,http://m.bbaqw.com/wz/42492.htm。  延伸查詢new window
3.(20161129)。現代社會應如何看待網絡募捐,http://bbs1.people.com.cn/post/1/1/2/159820891.html。  延伸查詢new window
4.(20161201)。大數據看羅爾事件:輿論場「變臉」有多快,http://www.bjnews.com.cn/graphic/2016/12/01/425632.html。  延伸查詢new window
 
 
 
 
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