鑒于"經濟分權,政治集權"的管理模式下,地方政府在執行環境規制過程中與中央政府目標不一致這一現象,本文考慮了相鄰地方政府投資環境保護行為的正外部效應與投資經濟行為的負外部效應對中央政府和地方政府環境規制選擇策略的影響;運用演化博弈理論構建了相鄰地方政府競爭視角下中央政府與地方政府的演化博弈模型,探討了博弈雙方的演化規律及行為特征;進一步結合理論分析,選取數值對獎勵力度、懲罰力度、相鄰地方政府投資環境保護的正外部效應系數及投資經濟行為的負外部效應系數對博弈主體實現穩定演化策略的作用機制進行仿真,并對博弈雙方實現演化穩定策略的動態軌跡進行分析,研究影響因素如何促進博弈主體實現博弈均衡。研究表明:(1)中央政府和地方政府的環境規制意愿對各影響因素的敏感性存在較大差異,地方政府的環境規制執行意愿對獎勵力度、相鄰地方政府競爭產生的正負外部效應更為敏感,中央政府和地方政府對懲罰力度均有較強的敏感性。(2)獎勵力度、懲罰力度和相鄰地方政府不同投資行為產生的正、負外部效應系數對實現環境規制理想局面的影響均存在門檻效應,只有在一定條件下,當相鄰地方政府投資行為的正負外部效應低于閾值或獎勵力度、懲罰力度超過閾值時,有利于促進中央政府和地方政府實現(執行,不監管)的理想局面。相對于投資經濟行為的負外部效應,有效控制投資環境保護行為的正外部效應更易于促進地方政府選擇執行環境規制策略。中央政府在績效考核體系中應充分運用相鄰地方政府競爭機制和獎勵機制對環境規制博弈雙方的影響差異,制定有效措施激勵地方政府積極執行環境規制。

In view of the ‘economic decentralization,political centralization’management model,the purpose of local governments are inconsistent with the central government’s objectives in in implementation of environmental regulation. This paper discussed impact of the positive externalities of investment in environmental protection of neighboring local governments and negative external effects of investment economic behaviors on environmental regulation choices of central government and local governments. The evolutionary game theory was used to construct the evolutionary game model between the central government and local government from the perspective of the competition of the neighboring local governments. Furthermore,the evolutionary rules and behavioral characteristics of the two sides of the game were discussed. In addition with theoretical analysis,we selected numerical values for incentives,penalties,positive externality coefficients of investment in local environmental protection for neighboring local governments and negative external effect coefficients for investment economic behaviors to simulate the action mechanism of game players to achieve a stable evolutionary strategy. Based on the dynamic trajectory analysis of the evolutionary stability strategies achieved by the two sides of the game,it analyzed how influencing factors promoted the game players to achieve game equilibrium. The research showed that: First,there was a large difference in the sensitivity of the central government and the local government ’s willingness to implement environmental regulation for various influencing factors. Local governments’ willingness to implement environmental regulations was more sensitive to factors such as reward,positive and negative external effects of neighboring local governments’ different investment behaviors. The central government and local governments had strong sensitivity to punishment. Second,there was a threshold effect on the ideal equilibrium of game players,which was generated by the factors including reward,the positive and negative external effects of neighboring local governments’ different investment behaviors. Only under certain conditions,when the positive and negative external effects of neighboring local government investment behaviors were lower than the threshold or the strength of incentives and penalties exceeded the threshold,the central government and local governments would be promoted to achieve the ideal situation(perform,not regulate). Compared with the negative external effects of investment economic behavior,it was easier to effectively control the positive external effects of the investment environment to promote local governments to choose the strategy of implement environmental regulation. In performance of appraisal system,the central government were supposed to make full use of the differences in the influence of the competition mechanisms and incentive mechanisms of neighboring local governments on the environmental regulation game,and take effective measures to encourage local governments to actively implement environmental regulations.