辯證法長期以來被當作形式方法來理解,致使其基本性質、特征和意義陷入晦暗之中。擺脫這種境況,需要從根本上對黑格爾和馬克思的辯證法開展出本體論基礎的研討。本文試圖就此闡明以下要點:(1)辯證法不是任何一種形式方法;形式方法只能滯留于"外部反思"的運用及其主觀主義的實質之中,從而表明其自身乃是形式主義的和反辯證法的。(2)黑格爾哲學立足于絕對者主體的自我活動,這一本體論立場在復活希臘辯證法的同時,決定性地重構了方法概念,并使方法成為實體性內容的自我展開過程。(3)在徹底摧毀"思辨神學"的本體論立場時,馬克思把辯證法重新建立在"實在主體"之自我活動的基礎之上;這樣的實在主體乃是既定的、具有實體性內容的社會,從而將其方法論揭示為"辯證法-唯物史觀-歷史科學"。只有通過本體論基礎的闡明,辯證法的實質和意義才突出地顯示出來,并由此形成對我們學術總體的積極動力。

Dialectics has long been understood as a formal method,its essential nature,characteristics,and significance have been largely obscured,therefore it is necessary to make a fundamental inquiry into the ontological foundation of Hegel’s and Marx’s dialectics. This paper attempts to make the following points:( 1) Dialectics is in no way a formal method,for a formal method cannot but remain an application of"external reflection"and be bound by its subjectivist nature,thus proving itself to be anti-dialectical.( 2)Hegel’s philosophy is based on the self-activity of the absolute subject. From this ontological standpoint,he decisively refashions the concept of method,making the method the process of the self-development of substantial content.( 3) In line with his destruction of the ontological standpoint of "speculative theology,"Marx rebuilds dialectics on the foundation of the self-activity of the "real subject,"which is effectively the preexisting society and which has substantial content. His methodology is thus revealed as"dialectic-historical materialist-historical science. "