康德在《判斷力批判》中聲稱:我們對美的判斷,不同于對快適和對善的判斷,既不帶有、也不激發利害或興趣。本文通過解決學者們提出的三點挑戰,證明康德該理論的正確性。筆者在文中聯系《純粹理性批判》的"三重綜合"學說,揭示審美之無利害性的先驗依據,即想象力之再生綜合。在此基礎上,筆者主張鑒賞判斷以其"無所謂實存"有別于感官判斷,又以其"不依賴概念"有別于道德判斷。雖然在經驗層面上,我們期望審美客體的繼續實存、以保留其在心靈中的鮮明表象;但在先驗層面上,我們對美的愉悅完全不激發興趣。這樣一種無關于欲求能力的愉悅,指向了我們理論理性的追求及其與實踐理性的終極統一。

In his third Critique,Kant declares the judgment of taste( namely,of the beautiful) to be neither interested nor interesting. This paper proves the tenability of Kant’s theory by solving three difficulties identified by commentators. With reference to Kant’s account of"threefold synthesis,"I reveal the transcendental ground of the disinterestedness of taste that is the imagination’s reproductive synthesis. On this basis,I argue that the judgment of taste differs from the judgment of sense by its indifference to existence and from the judgment of the good by its independence from concepts. Empirically,we desire a beautiful object’s continued existence so as to maintain its vivid impression in our mind. But transcendentally speaking,our pleasure in beauty does not arouse any interest. Such a desire-free satisfaction directly leads to the pursuit of theoretical reason and the latter’s ultimate unity with practical reason.