本文以電信服務與手機捆綁銷售模式為背景,研究了手機制造商主導下公平關切對手機制造商和服務運營商進行捆綁分銷合作時的價格和補貼決策、利潤分配以及補貼契約協調的影響。首先,分別給出了集中決策和補貼契約下捆綁銷售渠道的最優均衡結果;然后,分析了補貼契約下手機制造商的公平關切對手機制造商和服務運營商的均衡策略、渠道各方利潤以及整體利潤的影響;進一步地,對捆綁銷售模式下的補貼契約進行了協調性分析。研究結果表明:不利不公平厭惡將促使手機制造商制定一個較高的零售價格,從而惡化捆綁銷售渠道的整體效益;有利不公平厭惡將促使手機制造商制定一個較低的零售價格,從而改善捆綁銷售渠道的整體效益;然而,無論是否考慮手機制造商公平關切心理行為,補貼契約始終不能促使捆綁銷售渠道實現協調;此外,手機制造商一味追求較高的利潤分配比,并不一定能給自身帶來更多利潤,反而會降低整體利潤。

Recognizing the importance of fairness as well as the prevailing practice of telecom service and handset bundling in modern wireless businesses,the effects of the handset manufacturer’s fairness concerns on the pricing and subsidy policy,the profit distribution,and the coordination of subsidy contract under a handset manufacturer-Stackelberg structure are examined in this paper.Specifically,a setting in which a telecom service operator cooperates with a handset manufacturer to deliver the complementary telecom service and handset to end consumers is considered.The handset manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader,and sets the handset retail price,while the service operator responds by setting the subsidy as a Stackelberg follower.This problem is modeled and solved based on the game theoretical paradigm.First,the equilibrium strategies and equilibrium profits for the centralized model and subsidy contract model are presented,respectively.Then,the effects of fairness concerns of the handset manufacturer on the equilibrium strategies of the handset manufacturer and the service operator,the channel members’ profits,and the overall profit are analyzed.Furthermore,the channel coordination issue for the subsidy contract is investigated.The results show that the disadvantageous inequality aversion will promote the handset manufacturer to set a relatively higher retail price,and thus lead a deterioration of the overall performance.And the advantageous inequality aversion will promote the handset manufacturer to set a relatively lower retail price,and thus improve the overall performance.However,the channel coordination can not be achieved no matter the handset manufacturer cares about fairness or not.Besides,the results also show that blindly pursuing a high distributed ratio will not necessarily increase the handset manufacturer’s profit and will reduce the overall profits.These results indicate that it is important to consider the fairness issue in telecom service and handset bundling,especially for the situation when a handset manufacturer cooperates with a relative disadvantageous service operator.