本文以單個供應商和單個零售商組成的兩級供應鏈為對象,假設僅考慮供應商對產品安全方面的社會責任,研究了在供應商主導和零售商主導兩種權力配置模式下,供應商履行社會責任程度的差異,以及如何在供應商和零售商間建立合理的契約以激勵供應商社會責任的履行。研究發現,相對供應商主導,在零售商主導下供應商會更多地履行社會責任。引入收入共享的事后契約和成本共擔的事前契約后,在供應商主導下,兩種契約在一定條件下均能有效地激勵供應商更好地履行社會責任,但在留存比例與分擔比例相等的條件下,成本共擔契約的激勵效應更強。在零售商主導下,收入共享契約雖能激勵供應商的社會責任履行,但因導致零售商的利潤下降,故無法達成,而成本共擔契約只有在分擔足夠大時才有激勵效應。

Most studies addressing the problem of corporate social responsibility(CSR)stimulation of a supply chain assume that supplier dominates the supply chain.However,the tendency appears that the retailing market is becoming more and more concentrated so that the dominance of retailers on the supply chain gets more and more prominent for some industries.Furthermore,suppliers in the supply chains dominated by different parties may have different motivation to engage CSR and prefer different contracts.Therefore,how to motivate supplier to engage inmore social responsibilities under different power structure of supply chain is studied in this paper.A supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer is constructed.Assuming that only the supplier fulfills CSR,the market power structure(retailer-led and supplier-led)is integrated with the supply chain social responsibility incentive contract(revenue-sharing incentive and cost-sharing incentive)choice decision,aiming to maximize the social responsibility under the premise that profits increased for both parties of the supply chain after the contract is introduced.The following findings are contributed.Relative to the supplier-dominated mode,the supplier would undertake more social responsibility in the retailer-dominatedmode.With the introduction of revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract,it is found that the cost-sharing contract is more effective even though both contracts are feasible to stimulate suppers’ social responsibilities in the supplier-led model.However,in the retailer-dominated mode,the revenue-sharing contract can motivate the suppliers to undertake more corporate social responsibility,but a fails to increase the profit of retailer.The contract can’t thereby be reached.The cost-sharing contract only has a stimulating effect when the sharing rate is big enough,which is inconsistent with the intuition.All the findings are demonstrated by the simulation results.It is revealed,on the one hand,sharing contract can motivate suppliers to fulfill CSR,and on the other hand,it provides implications to motivate suppliers’ CSR initiatives for the retailer-led supply chain.