消費擴大驅動下食品質量安全問題日漸嚴峻,食品企業經濟利益驅動型摻假所具有的蓄意性、隱蔽性、技術性特點,為新時期食品安全治理提出了一系列挑戰。鑒于此,本文借助演化博弈理論,考慮了食品企業收益、食品生產技術成本、生產殘次食品損失以及政府監管成本、社會負面效益等因素對食品安全風險形成的影響,構建了食品摻假行為演化博弈模型,并對其演化狀態進行了理論和仿真分析。在此基礎上,運用元胞自動機理論,進一步考慮到食品企業策略轉變意愿與基層食品監管機構策略轉變意愿,從空間博弈角度對食品摻假行為及其監管的空間演化狀態進行了深度剖析和刻畫。研究結果顯示,食品企業和基層食品監管機構在策略選擇方面具有同步性振蕩特征。而且,在食品企業策略轉變意愿或基層食品監管機構策略轉變意愿維持較低水平時,食品企業和基層食品監管機構的策略(嚴格監管,合規生產)是純策略穩定狀態。通過本文研究既豐富了我國食品安全監管理論,也為地方食品安全長效監管提供了思路借鑒和理論指導。

In recent years, with the expansion of people’s consumption scale, the issue of food safety has increasingly become the focus of scholars. As the Economically Motivated Adulteration(EMA) has the characteristics of deliberate, hidden and technical, it has put forward a series of challenges for food safety management in the new era. In this article, to solve the regulatory dilemma shown in the replicator dynamics equation, the spatial model of food regulatory agencies and food enterprises is constructed based on the cellular automata. The results show that, the food enterprises and the grassroots food regulatory agencies have the characteristics of synchronous shock in the selection of strategies. Moreover, when the strategic change intention of food enterprises or the strategic change intention of grassroots food regulatory agencies remains at a low level, the strategies of food enterprises and grassroots food regulatory agencies achieve long-term stability, and its stable state is(strict supervision, compliance production). Finally, based on the perspective of government regulation, the countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to ensure long-term supervision of regional food safety. This paper’s results not only enrich the theory of food safety supervision in China, but also provid ideas and theoretical guidance for long-term local food safety supervision.