近20年來,借助于社會心理學和個性心理學中的境況主義實驗以及認知科學的研究成果,一些哲學家論證說,美德倫理學特別是亞里士多德式的美德倫理學不可能是經驗上適當的。盡管這些方面的經驗研究確實為我們理解道德動機和道德判斷的心理機制做出了重要貢獻,但它們實際上并不構成對美德倫理學的決定性反駁。實際上,亞里士多德倫理學不僅本身就預示了一些重要的經驗發現,而且也能回應哲學境況主義者對美德倫理學提出的所謂"挑戰"。

Over the past 20 years,drawing on the situationist experience of social and individual psychology and the research findings of cognitive science, some philosophers have argued that virtue ethics,especially Aristotelean virtue ethics,is not empirically applicable. Although empirical research contributes to our understanding of the psychological mechanisms behind moral motives and judgments,it cannot be used as a decisive refutation of virtue ethics.In fact,Aristotelean ethics itself not only presages some important empirical findings but also responds to the situationist challenge to virtue ethics.