本文旨在分析康德的"Interesse"概念,討論這個概念對理解《判斷力批判》"美的分析"的重要意義。依據康德的規定,Interesse并不是指鑒賞者對美不感興趣,而指是他在做出鑒賞判斷時對審美對象的實際存在沒有興趣。在這一基本框架下,審美判斷所內蘊的自由就被凸顯出來,由于興趣總是關系到對象的實際存在,因此在無興趣的條件下,審美判斷就擺脫了判斷者任何的主觀偏好。由此,鑒賞者才有權要求別人和自己做出相同的審美判斷,并進而達成普遍的認同;而審美判斷的自由特性同樣構成了其與道德判斷同構性的內在根據,在此基礎上,美有資格成為德性的象征。

This article takes Immanuel Kant’s concept of"interesse",and investigates its meaning for understanding of Critique of the Power of Judgment. According to Kant,interesse does not mean that the judging subject is disinterested in beauty,but in the real existence of the object of judgment. Within such a frame,the freedom internal to aesthetic judgment is highlighted. Because interest always concerns the real object,aesthetic judgment without interest is free from subjective preference. Under such circumstances,the subject is entitled to the request of the same judgment from others and thus together they reach universal identity.The freedom is the basis of identity between judgment of taste and judgment of morality,and thus beauty is a symbol of morality.