康德之后,德國唯心論致力于將理性自身論證為世界的實體和本原,并將世界的展開論證為理性自身運動的后果,也即致力于構造出一種理性的內在性總體科學。但是這一方案卻內在地忽略了這樣一個重大問題:世界和理性終歸是存在而非不存在,這一事實的動力何在?"為什么畢竟有某物存在,為什么無不存在?"這一問題不僅指向一種后唯心論視野下人們對于存在與自由的更高理解,也讓謝林在與近代哲學傳統和黑格爾的爭辯中超越德國唯心論的理性內在性方案,提出了"邏輯性—否定哲學"和"歷史性—肯定哲學"的區分,進而開辟了德國唯心論的新路向。

After Kant,the all-encompassing task of German idealism was to justify reason itself as the substance and principle of the world,and to justify the unfolding of the world as the consequence of the activity of reason itself; that is,to construct a rational,immanent,and complete science. But the ultimate question begged by this proposed solution is,what motivates the fact that the world and reason exist rather than do not? That is,"why is there something rather than nothing?"This problem not only points to a higher understanding of existence and freedom from the perspective of meta-idealism,but also boosted Schelling beyond the rational internalism of German idealism,letting him put forward the distinction between "the logical-negative philosophy"and "the historic-positive philosophy",thereby opening up another path for German idealism.