創新是經濟發展的第一動力,建設創新型國家是我國當前及未來經濟轉型的重要方向。本文基于高管薪酬粘性的角度探討企業如何提高高管研發創新的積極性,研究發現:(1)高管薪酬粘性與企業創新投資水平顯著正相關,且在非國有企業和高科技企業更加顯著;(2)高管薪酬粘性并非越高越好,只有當業績下降時對高管輕罰或適當獎勵,薪酬粘性才能顯著提升企業創新投資水平;(3)在創新投入后,業績下降時適當地獎勵高管有助于提升創新投資轉化為專利產出的效率。本文研究表明,高管薪酬粘性一定程度上是薪酬制定者容忍管理層失敗的制度安排,適當地包容或獎勵管理層從事冒險活動有助于提高企業的創新投資水平和效率。

Innovation is the first driving force of economic development at present and in the future. This paper examines whether executives are motivated to do more innovation by sticky compensation contracts. We find that:(1) executive compensation stickness is positively related to firm’ s innovation investment,and the positive relationship is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises and high-technology firms.(2) The executive compensation stickness significantly stimulate the firm’ s innovation investment only when the executives are not punished or even properly reward for failure.(3) The executive compensation stickness improve the efficiency of the innovation investment translated to patents only when the executives are reward for failure.The results show that the executive compensation stickness is an incentive strategy that tolerate failure,which further enhance the firm’ s innovation investment and innovation efficiency.