1936年,兩廣"六一事變"之後,國民黨中央恢復對廣東的實際控制。其後,廣東納入準備和實現全國抗戰的統一籌劃之下,蔣介石開始對廣東軍政的具體領導和指導。在此期間,蔣介石對協調廣東軍政、指導對日佈防投入了一定心力,曾設想以華南為第二大抗日基地;並捐棄前嫌,起用一批在內戰期間曾參與反蔣的粵系將領。但蔣對於日軍大舉侵粵,在判斷與指導上存在明顯失誤。他對華南地區的人事安排和調整未能盡如人意,軍政之間長期不能配合;對失誤較多的余漢謀等人過於寬縱,致使華南抗戰工作遭受一定損失。

In 1936, once the Central Committee of the Kuomintang regained control of Guangdong and resolved the "June First Incident," Guangdong was incorporated into a unified plan for carrying out the total war of resistance, and Chiang Kai-shek began to take direct control of the province’s military and political affairs. He put substantial effort into coordinating Guangdong’s military and political affairs and leading the deployment of resistance against Japan, and he had planned to use South China as a second base of resistance. He threw away past resentments and made use of some Guangdong generals who had participated in Anti-Chiang activities during the civil war. However, he obviously made mistakes in judgment and leadership regarding Japan’s massive invasion into Guangdong. His personnel management in South China was below expectations, and made coordination between the military and civilian authorities impossible for a long time. For example, he was too lenient with those like Yu Hanmou who had made many mistakes. All of this set back the resistance efforts in South China.