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題名：台灣財務危機公司之預測與其盈餘管理行為
作者：謝宛庭 引用關係
作者(外文)：Wan-Ting Hsieh
校院名稱：國立成功大學
系所名稱：會計學系碩博士班
指導教授：吳清在
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2006
主題關鍵詞：財務危機；離散時間涉險模式；盈餘離群值；盈餘管理；實質交易操作；Financial distress；Real Activities manipulation；Earnings management；Discrete-time hazard model；Earnings outliers
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第一部分 台灣財務危機公司之預測
企業經營不善而發生財務危機，一般有跡可循，企業財務危機爆發之前大都有一連串徵兆。為保障債權人、投資人之權益，並降低資訊不對等之社會成本以維持公開市場之安定運作，因此有需要探究公司發生財務危機之原因及其警訊，並建立較佳之財務危機預測模式。異於過去之研究，本文首度採用吳清在與Lilien（2003）之盈餘離群值為財務危機預測模型之解釋變數之一，離群值分析考慮特定公司盈餘之時間序列，而非單期之橫斷面資訊。此外，本文在探討台灣上市上櫃公司財務危機之預測模型時，採用結合存活分析及logit模式之「離散時間涉險模式」，此種涉險模式考慮公司從上市上櫃至發生財務危機之存活時間內每一期之風險，所採用解釋變數之數值亦隨時間而變動，較之單期之邏輯司特迴歸分析，更有資訊利用豐富之優勢。
由本文台灣財務危機公司預測模型之實證結果發現，在顯著水準1%下，「離散時間涉險模式」之時間虛擬變數（D3, D5, D7）、會計變數（CACL、TLTA、NITA、RETA、CFTL）、市場變數（AR、SIGMA）、公司治理變數（OWN、MGT）、盈餘離群值（TEMP）、其他變數（CPA、GC、DEFAULT、CEO、CFO、IA）皆為顯著且與預期相符。亦即，除假說三（公司規模與公司年齡）與預期不符外，其餘之假說均與預期相符。此外，本文發現當預測模式中僅放入永久性盈餘離群值與暫時性盈餘離群值，模式解釋能力達75%，因此，台灣上市櫃公司有越負向永久性盈餘離群值（PERM）或負向暫時性盈餘離群值（TEMP）時，則公司越可能發生財務危機，此意味著台灣上市上櫃公司若面臨負向盈餘異常時，越可能發生財務危機。
另外，本文針對離散時間涉險模式、logit模式與會計師審計意見進行比較。研究發現，在考慮實際事前機率與成本比率下，運用離散時間涉險模式之預測精確度顯著高於會計師審計意見及logit模式。然而，離散時間涉險模式與會計師審計意見預測精確度之比較基礎不一致，因為會計師所出具之審計意見係基於企業未發生財務危機以前之事前資訊進行判斷，而離散時間涉險模式係已知企業發生財務危機之事後資訊進行分析，因此可能導致離散時間涉險模式之預測精確度高於會計師之審計意見。另外，離散時間涉險模式之預測精確度亦高於logit模式，意味著考量企業所有存活時間之離散時間涉險模式即使收集資訊成本較高，但仍具有預測之價值性。
第二部分 台灣財務危機公司之盈餘管理行為
當公司面臨財務困難，但又要維持財務報表使用者之預期，企業經理人通常會樂觀地預期公司財務狀況惡化只是暫時性，而透過裁決性會計處理或運用成本較高之「實質交易操作」以美化財務報表。因此，財務危機公司經理人傳遞會計資訊給投資人時，可能有高估盈餘之行為。本文旨在探討財務危機公司經理人在公司發生財務危機以前，如何採取應變措施，以粉飾其財務報表。財務危機公司之經理人為提高公司之會計盈餘，可能會從事盈餘管理行為以粉飾公司之財務報表，其可能採行之盈餘管理行為，可能包括裁決性應計項目之「會計操作」及影響營業現金流量之「實質交易操作」。
本文首先探討財務危機公司之經理人是否會透過盈餘管理以隱匿其財務惡化徵兆，本研究實證結果發現，台灣財務危機公司之經理人會採行增加公司盈餘之盈餘管理方法（包括應計項目、裁決性應計項目等「會計操作」，或增加期末銷貨額、刪減裁決性支出、過量生產等「實質交易操作」）以隱匿財務惡化之徵兆，此結論支持本研究之假說一。
此外，由於會計師之查核報告會影響財務危機公司之盈餘管理行為，本文進一步探討會計師在偵測盈餘高估時所扮演之角色。財務危機公司若事前收到會計師出具繼續經營疑慮之查核意見，則會計師會要求公司迴轉其高估之盈餘，此時企業經理人所採行之盈餘管理程度將會較低而且通常為降低會計盈餘之盈餘管理行為。本研究實證結果發現，有繼續經營疑慮之財務危機公司由於受到會計師之密切監督，其經理人較不會採行提高盈餘管理方法（如應計項目、裁決性應計項目等「會計操作」，及增加期末銷貨額或過量生產等「實質交易操作」），此結論亦支持本研究之假說二。
Part I
There are clues before a firm faces financial disaster. To reduce costs resulting from information asymmetry and protect investors and creditors, it is desirable to develop a better model for predicting financially-distressed firms. This study aims at developing a hazard model to predict firms that face the financially distressed risk in Taiwan. Unlike prior studies, for the first time I employ Wu and Lilien (2003)’s earnings outliers method by using outlier analysis on earnings series in my prediction model for financially-distressed firms in Taiwan. In this study, I employ the discrete-time hazard model to construct my prediction model, which combines survival analysis and logit model to predict financially-distressed firms. A hazard model corrects coefficients for PERMiods at risk and allows time-varying covariates. It uses all available information to estimate the probability for financially-distressed firms at each point in time in the study.
Our empirical results show the followings: significant independent variables for predicting financially-distressed firms in the discrete-time hazard model are time dummy variables (T3, T5, T7), the current ratio, the debt ratio, the net income to assets ratio, the retained earnings to total assets ratio, the cash flow to liabilities ratio, stock abnormal returns, variance of stock returns, directors and managers shareholdings, board chairman acting as CEO, temporary earnings outliers, auditor switch, receiving a going-concern GC, default in debt covenants, changes in CEO, CFO and director of internal auditor. However, the hypothesis 3 (SIZE, AGE) are not supported from my empirical study. Furthermore, Empirical results show that two earnings outliers can make model concordance reaching 75%, which implies Taiwan’s listed firms having negative permanent or temporary earnings outliers may face financial disaster.
I further compare the prediction accuracy of discrete-time hazard model, logit model and auditor GC. Considering the actual beforehand proportion and cost ratio, our empirical results show the followings: the prediction accuracy of discrete-time hazard model is higher than that of logit model and auditor’s GC. However, the comparative bases of discrete-time hazard model and auditor GC are different. An auditor’s GC is based on beforehand information before firms face the financially distress risk. On the other hand, the discrete-time hazard model is based on the ex-post information after firms face the financially distress risk. Such difference may lead to the higher prediction accuracy of discrete-time hazard model than that of auditor’s GC. In addition, the prediction accuracy of discrete-time hazard model is also higher than that of logit model. Although discrete-time hazard model needs information in all survival time, it adds value in predicting accuracy comparing to single-PERMiod logit model.
Part II
As a firm faces financial difficulties, its management is apt to window-dress financial reports for meeting outsiders’ expectations. Earnings management behaviors may include lower-cost discretionary accounting treatments or higher-cost real activities that affect operational cash flows. This study aims at exploring earnings management behaviors of financially-distressed firms in Taiwan. The results of earnings management of financially-distressed firms will overstate income.
First, I investigate whether managers of financially-distressed firms are more likely to make income-increasing earnings management. Empirical results indicate that, for concealing unfavorable financial situation and increasing firms’ income, managers of financially-distressed firms in Taiwan take both accounting accruals and real activities manipulations. Empirical results support my hypothesis I.
Second, I explore whether going-concern opinion issued by an auditor will affect its client’s earnings management behaviors. When a firm gets a going-concern opinion from its CPA, the auditor will generally require its client to reverse the overstated earnings. My empirical results show that firms receiving going-concern opinions from their CPA’s will not take accounting accruals and real activities manipulations that increase firms’income. This conclusion is consistent with my hypothesis II.
第一部分 台灣財務危機公司之預測
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第二部分 台灣財務危機公司之盈餘管理行為
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