臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆   第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁
/1頁
題名：薪資制度、薪資決定及其政策
作者：簡文政
作者(外文)：Wen-Jhan Jane
校院名稱：國立中央大學
系所名稱：產業經濟研究所
指導教授：單驥
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2007
主題關鍵詞：競賽理論；論件計酬制；月薪制；監督成本；Mincerian薪資方程式；薪資不均度；公平理論；Piece rate scheme；Professional baseball；Tournament theory；Pay equality；Human capital；Endogeneity；Mincerian wage equation；Salary scheme；Performance uncertainty；Monitoring cost
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(6) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:6
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:0
薪資是勞資關係中重要的議題之一，不但受到學術界的重視，亦是業界所關心的問題。勞方冀望能獲得優渥的待遇，資方卻希望能減少人事支出，以獲取極大利潤。由於勞資雙方認知上的差異，造成薪資問題爭議不斷，不過這卻是雙方都必須共同面對的問題。關於薪資的相關問題一直在勞動經濟的文獻中被探討著。在本研究中，我們將對於薪資這相關的議題做三方面的研究。本研究前兩個議題是針對個體資料 (micro data)架構所做的研究，最後一個議題乃是針對總體資料 (macro data)所做的研究。第一個議題是針對薪資制度 (wage scheme)設計方面所作的探討，這方面的研究可以讓我們藉由計量上的工具來檢驗一個組織內部工資制度的情況。然後，對照監督成本 (monitoring cost)在工資制度所扮演的角色來探討研究對象是否遵守一般勞動經濟文獻上的關係，進而印證此一關係或是歸納新的結論。接著會由人力資源的角度出發檢驗工資決定理論，檢驗教育、經驗與員工績效何者決定工資?第三部份為本研究的主軸，也是企業最關心的問題---薪資結構與組織績效。薪資結構如何影響組織積效?以及薪資不均度會不會有一個最適狀態?
針對廠商內部工資與個體或是組織績效的實證研究是相對較少的，這是因為這類分析往往需要僱主和勞工配對的資料 (matched employer-employee data)。相反地，職業運動提供相當豐富的資料來研究勞動領域的研究。而這些重要的研究得以成就乃是歸功於此一產業透明化的資料結構與實證資料容易取得。沒有一個研究領域像職業運動可以提供如此詳細的個人績效、工資與團隊績效的歷史資料 (Kahn, 2000)。因此，研究的資料將採用中華職棒7支隊伍183位球員1990-2000年的薪資與績效的資料來檢驗這勞動經濟學中的三大議題。
勞工勞務的補貼方案有許多的形式。在本研究的第一部份我們將集中在論件計酬制與月薪制來探討。論件計酬制在監督成本低時會受到組織的青睞；而當監督成本提高，主管需要花費更大的成本在「論件」的監督上時，計酬的方式便會比較傾向月薪制。想像在一個數線上，兩端分別為這兩種勞務補貼方案，而研究的方法便是在於利用中華職棒所提供的個人薪資與績效的不對稱縱橫資料 (unbalanced panel data)，以Lazear (1986)所提出的實證式子，驗證中華職棒球員在資料中所顯示出來勞務補貼方案的形式，究竟是向數線的哪一邊傾斜?第二部份研究薪資決定的研究方法乃是參考Mincer (1974)與Gius and Johnson (2000)的薪資方程式，以球員特徵變數與績效變數作為自變數的區分，用以迴歸職棒球員的薪資。第三部份所針對的研究，將先針對人力資本與薪資不均度對組織績效的關係設立一個簡單的理論模型，所得到的最適條件得以推論人力資本與薪資不均度間存在著抵換 (tradeoff)關係。其經濟意涵表示理性的球團管理者在選秀時，不僅僅要考慮增加球隊的人力資本，也必須考慮整體球隊薪資不均度的問題。以選秀的決策為例，在球隊花費巨款選擇人力資本高的「超級明星」同時，所造成的不均度將會使得整體產生負面的效果。接著，實證的方法將以Depken (2000)為依據，利用固定效果 (fixed effect)與隨機效果 (random effect)模型來印證理論模型的結果，進而分析人力資本與薪資不均度對組織績效的影響。
藉由本文三篇獨立研究所歸納的結論如下：第一，薪資制度無法明確地如監督成本的理論所預測：在球員績效幾乎為完全透明化下，薪資的採用在實證的結果顯示較為支持月薪制。第二，薪資的決定在不考慮內生性的情況下，球員特徵變數對於薪資的決定效果非常顯著，不過在考量內生性後其顯著性減弱；然而績效變數的反應相差不大。個人的特徵與績效變數均能影響薪資，而實證證據顯示個人特徵變數的效果較強。這個結果與薪資制度檢驗出傾向月薪制的結論相互呼應。第三部份的實證結果顯示球員的人力資本確實對於球隊績效有正面的影響，而薪資不均度也呼應理論模型中二階條件的重要假設，形成不均度與績效間倒U字型的關係。故組織存在一個最適的薪資不均度。是故球隊在考量聘用球員應同時考量高人力人才所帶來的「效率」與其所造成的不「公平」對組織的傷害。
The problem of wages is one of the important topics in the relations between labor (e.g., employees) and capital (e.g., employers). It is not only received the attention of the academia, but also be cared by the persons in the industrial circles. Employees hope to obtain the better payments, but employers want to reduce the personnel expenditures for gaining more profits. Due to the cognitive differences that have in both sides between labor and capital, the dispute of the wages is never ended. Therefore, this is a question that both sides must face together.
The relevant issues about wages have continuously discussed in the literature of labor economics. In this research, we research three aspects of issues related to the wage. The former two topics aim at the micro data analysis, and the last one focuses on the macro data. The first topic designs the discussion for the system of the wage schemes, the research in this aspect let us examine the situation of the wage system inside an organization. Then, by comparing to the role of monitoring cost in the theory of wage schemes, we discuss the wage schemes in an organization corresponding to the relation in the literatures of labor economics. Furthermore, our conclusions sum up a new explanation about the performance uncertainty. In the second part, we start from the viewpoint of the human resources to examine the theory of the salary determination and investigate the relationships between the employees’ characteristics (e.g. education, experience, and performance) and salary. The third main topic is the question which enterprises care the most--- The structure of the wages and organizational performance. How does the structure of wages influence the organizational performance? And is the degree of wage dispersion an optimal level?
The empirical researches about the salary to the individual and organizational performance are relatively less, because this kind of analysis often needs matched employer-employee data. On the contrary, professional sports offer quite abundant materials to study the researches in the field of labor economics. The achievements in these important researches owe the credit to the transparence in the industry and the convenience in obtaining the empirical data. None of research fields like professional sports can offer such a detailed personal performance, historical data of salary and organizational performance (Kahn, 2000). Therefore, the study will adopt 267 players’ (including 183 hitters and 84 pitchers) salary and performance data in 7 teams of Chinese Professional Baseball League for the period from 1990 to 2000 to examine these three major topics in labor economics.
Compensation for services rendered can take many forms, but in this work we focus on the piece rate and salary wage schemes to discuss the possible wage structure for an organization. It is commonly argued in the literature that a monitoring cost is the key factor for the piece rate wage scheme to be adopted. To shed further light on this issue we utilize the empirical model first suggested by Lazear (1986) to test the wage structure of an organization. It is to consult the wages equation of Mincer (1974) and Gius and Johnson (2000) to study the research approaches of the wages determination in the second part. Independent variables of players’ characteristics and performance are used to be the regressors in the wage equation. In the third part of the research, we firstly set up a simple theoretical model to descript the relation of organizational performance to the human capital and wage dispersion, the optimal conditions indicate the tradeoff relationship between human capital and wage dispersion. The economic implication shows that the rational manager in a baseball team should not only consider the human capital of the team but the degree of the whole team’s wages dispersion. Taking the decision of drafting as an example, the inequality in wage causes the negative effects when the manager drafts a super star player for a huge expenditure. Then, the method of the empirical regressions will be based on Depken (2000). Using the fixed effect and random effect models identifies the results in our theoretical model.
The conclusions are summed up independently as follows: Firstly, the system of the wages is unable to correspond to the predictions of monitoring cost clearly. Our empirical evidence suggests that the small professional baseball leagues in Taiwan will normally adopt the salary payment scheme rather than the piece rate payment scheme, even though the players’ on-field performance can be accurately and easily observed. We note that the key factor for not choosing the piece rate wage scheme may not be due to the high cost of monitoring, as is argued in the literature, but may be caused by performance uncertainty. For the wage determination, individual’s characteristic variables (age and experience) are always significant when we employ the fixed and random effect model. Furthermore, we consider the endogeneity problem from performance variable and use 2SLS regressions to fix the endogeneity, the individual’s characteristic variables still significant and only two in five performance indexes (runs scored and safety hits) achieve the significant level. For the wage structure, the first-stage estimators from 2SLS regression are used to calculate the degree of wage dispersion in a team. The results are more in line with “tournament”. Thirdly, the human capital really has positive influence on team’s performance, and the degree of wage dispersion echoes the important assumptions of second order condition in the theory model. This indicates the inverse U-shape relationship between the wage dispersion and the organizational performance, and there exists the optimal level of wage dispersion in an organization. Therefore, a manager in a team should not only consider the ‘efficiency (benefits)’ from the high stock of human capital but the ‘inequality (costs)’ from the hurt in an organization when they draft players.
Gould, E. D. and Winter, E. (2005), “Rational Peer Effects Between Workers: Evidence from Professional Baseball”, working paper.
Jewell, R. T. and Molina, D. J. (2004), “Productive Efficiency and Salary Distribution: the Case of US Major League Baseball”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 51(February), 127-42.
Kahn, L.M. (2000), “The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (3), 75-94.
Kandel, E. and Lazear, E. P. (1992), “Peer Pressure and Partnerships”, Journal of Political Economy 100(4), 801-17.
Lazear, E. P. (1986), “Salaries and Piece Rates”, Journal of Business, 59(3), 405-431.
Lazear, E. P. (1996), Personnel economics, MIT Press, p3.
Porter, P. and Scully, G. (1982), “Measuring managerial efficiency: the case of baseball”, Southern Economic Journal 48, 642-50.
Rottenberg, S. (1956), “The baseball players’ labor market”, Journal of Political Economy 64 (June), 242-58.
Rosen, S. and Sanderson, A. (2001), “Labour Markets in Professional Sports”, The Economic Journal 111 (February), F47-F68.
Scully, G. W. (1974), “Pay and performance in major league baseball”, American Economic Review 64 (December), 915-30.

References

Copeland, A. and Monnet, C. (2002), “The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes”, University of Minnesota, Working Paper.
Doeringer, D. W., and Piore, M., (1985), Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1971. (Armonk, NY: London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., reprinted 1985).
Fama, E. (1980), “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307.
Freeman, R. B. and Kleiner, M. M. (2005), “The Last American Shoe Manufacturers Decreasing Productivity and Increasing Profits in the Shift from Piece Rates to Continuous Flow Production”, Industrial Relations, 44(2), 307-330.
Gunderson, M. (1975), “Male Female Wage Differentials and the Impact of Equal Pay Legislation”, Review of Economic Statistics, 57(4), 426-470.
Hausman, J. A. (1978) Specification tests in econometrics, Econometrica, 46, 1251-71.
Lazear, E. P. (1986), “Salaries and Piece Rates”, Journal of Business, 59(3), 405-431.
Lazear, E. P. (2000), “Performance Pay and Productivity”, American Economic Review, 90, 1346-1361.
Seiler, E. (1984), “Piece Rates vs. Time Rates: The Effect of Incentives on Earnings”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 66, 363-376.
Weiss, A. (1992), “Productivity Gains without Formal Training”, Department of Economics, Boston University Working Paper Number 9, March.
References

Adams, J. S. (1963), “Toward an Understanding of Inequity”, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67, 422-436.
Akerlof, G. A. and J. L. Yellen (1988): “Fairness and Unemployment”, American Economic Review, 78, 44-49.
Akerlof, G. A. and J. L. Yellen (1990): “The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(2), 255-283.
Copeland, A. and Monnet, C. (2002): “The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes”, University of Minnesota, Working Paper.
Davidson, R. and J. MacKinnon (1993): Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, New York: Oxford University Press.
Depken, C. A. (2000): “Wage Disparity and Team Productivity: Evidence from Major League Baseball”, Economics Letters, 67, 87-92.
Demougin, D. and A. Siow (1994): “Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies”, American Economic Review, 84(5), 1261-1277.
Ehrenberg, R. C. and M. L. Bognanno (1990): “The Incentive Effects of Tournaments Revisited: Evidence from the European PGA Tour”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, special issue, S74-S88.
Fama, E. (1980): “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307.
Fizel, J. (1996): “Bias in Salary Arbitration: the Case of Major League Baseball”, Applied Economics, 28, 255-265.
Folger, R. (1993): “Reactions to Mistreatment at Work,” in J. K. Murnighan (Ed.) Social Psychology in Organizations: Advances in Theory and Research, 161-83, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Freeman, R. B. and Kleiner, M. M. (2005): “The Last American Shoe Manufacturers Decreasing Productivity and Increasing Profits in the Shift from Piece Rates to Continuous Flow Production”, Industrial Relations, 44(2), 307-330.
Frick, B., Prinz, J., K. Winkelmann (2003): “Pay Inequalities and Team Performance: Empirical Evidence from the North American Major Leagues”, International Journal of Manpower, 24(4), 472-88.
Gius, M. and Johnson, D. (2000): “Race and Compensation in Professional Football”, Applied Economics Letters, 7, 73-75.
Gunderson, M. (1975): “Male Female Wage Differentials and the Impact of Equal Pay Legislation”, Review of Economic Statistics, 57(4), 426-470.
Harris, M. and Holmstrom, B. (1982): “A theory of wage dynamics”, Review of Economic Studies, 49(3), 315-333.
Hausman, J. A. (1978): Specification tests in econometrics, Econometrica, 46, 1251-71.
Heckman, J. J., L. J. Lochner, and P. E. Todd (2003): “Fifty years of Mincer earnings regressions,” Working Paper 9732, NBER.
Hellerstein, J. K. and D. Neumark (1995): “Are Earnings Profiles Steeper than Productivity Profiles: Evidence from Israeli Firm-Level Data”, Journal of Human Resources, 30, 89-112.
Kotlikoff, L. J. and J. Gokhale (1992): “Estimating a Firm’s Age-Productivity Profile Using the Present Value of Workers’ Earnings”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(4), 1215-1242.
Lazear, E. P. (1981): “Agency, earnings profiles, productivity and hours restrictions”, American Economic Review, 71, 606-720.
------ (1986): “Salaries and Piece Rates”, Journal of Business, 59(3), 405-431.
------ (1998): Personnel Economics for Managers, New York: Wiley.
------ (2000): “Performance Pay and Productivity”, American Economic Review, 90, 1346-1361.
Lallemand, T., R. Plasman and R. Rycx (2004): “Intra-Firm Wage Dispersion and Firm Performance: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data”, KYKLOS, 57(4), 533-58.
Medoff, J., Abraham, K. (1980): “Experience, performance, and earnings”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 95 (4), 703-736, December.
------ (1981): “Are those paid more really more productive? The case of experience”, The Journal of Human Resources 15 (2), 186-216.
Mincer, J. (1958): “Investment in human capital and personal income distribution”, Journal of Political Economy, 66, 281-302.
------ (1974): Schooling, Experience and Earnings, Columbia University Press, New York.
Prendergast, C. (1993): “ The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(2), 523-534.
Pfeffer, J. (1994): Competitive Advantage Through People: Unleashing the Power of the Work Force, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Richards, D. G. and R. C. Guell (1998): “Baseball Success and the Structure of Salaries”, Applied Economics Letters, 5, 291-296.
Scully, G. W. (1974): “Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball”, American Economic Review, 64(6), 915-930.
Seiler, E. (1984): “Piece Rates vs. Time Rates: The Effect of Incentives on Earnings”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 66, 363-376.
Weiss, A. (1992): “Productivity Gains without Formal Training”, Department of Economics, Boston University Working Paper Number 9, March.
References

Adams, J. S. (1963), “Toward an Understanding of Inequity,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67, 422-436.
Akerlof, G. A. and Yellen, J. L. (1988), “Fairness and Unemployment,” American Economic Review, 78, 44-49.
Akerlof, G. A. and Yellen, J. L. (1990), “The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CV, 255-83.
Battese, G. and T. Coelli (1995), “A model for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic frontier production function for panel data.” Empirical Economics, 20, pp. 325-32.
Bloom, M. (1999), “The Performance Effects of Pay Dispersion on Individuals and Organizations,” Academy Management Journal, 42(1), 25-40.new window
Depken, C. A. (2000), “Wage Disparity and Team Productivity: Evidence from Major League Baseball,” Economics Letters, 67, 87-92.
Ehrenberg, R. C. and Bognanno, M. L. (1990), “The Incentive Effects of Tournaments Revisited: Evidence from the European PGA Tour,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, special issue, S74-S88.
Folger, R. (1993), “Reactions to Mistreatment at Work,” in J. K. Murnighan (Ed.) Social Psychology in Organizations: Advances in Theory and Research: 161-83, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Frick, B., Prinz, J., Winkelmann, K. (2003), “Pay Inequalities and Team Performance: Empirical Evidence from the North American Major Leagues,” International Journal of Manpower, 24(4), 472-88.
Hausman, J. A. (1978), “Specification Tests in Econometrics,” Econometrica, 46, 1251-71.
Lallemand, T., Plasman, R. and Rycx, R. (2004), “Intra-Firm Wage Dispersion and Firm Performance: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data,” KYKLOS, 57(4), 533-58.
Lazear, E. P. (1998), Personnel Economics for Managers, New York: Wiley.
Lazear, E. P. (1989), “Pay Equality and Industrial Politics,” Journal of Political Economy, 97, 561-80.
Lazear, E. P. and Rosen, S. (1981), “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,” Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841-64.
Pfeffer, J. (1994), Competitive Advantage Through People: Unleashing the Power of the Work Force, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Pfeffer, J. and Langton, N. (1993), “The Effect of Wage Dispersion on Satisfaction, Productivity, and Working Collaboratively: Evidence from College and University Faculty,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 382-407.
Richards, D. G. and Guell, R. C. (1998), “Baseball Success and the Structure of Salaries,” Applied Economics Letters, 5, 291-96.
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

目前上線人數：404（臺灣：326，外國：78） ／ 本年度總使用人次：1348743 ／ 訪客人次（自102年09月）：67145477
國家圖書館著作權聲明 Copyright © 2013 All rights reserved.
本館地址: 100201臺北市中山南路20號． 本館地圖及交通資訊．
總機：(02)23619132．最佳瀏覽解析度為1024x768以上