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題名：公司治理、過度自信經理人對於公司現金持有價值之影響
作者：徐鳳儀
校院名稱：逢甲大學
系所名稱：商學博士學位學程
指導教授：張森河
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2018
主題關鍵詞：現金持有價值；過度自信；公司治理；Cash holdings；Overconfidence；Corporate Governance
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現金是一項高流動性、低報酬性的資產，企業持有過多現金產生機會成本，持有過少又增加企業經營風險，持有1元現金是否創造大於1元的價值，有賴企業管理者的經營策略與發展。本研究主要探討經理人過度自信、公司治理對於企業持有現金價值的影響。
實證結果，經理人過度自信對於企業持有現金的價值明顯降低，而透過公司治理機制能有效的弱化經理人的過度自信，明顯的提高公司持有現金邊際價值達2.28倍。在良好公司治理機制下能增加持有現金的邊際價值，且其為公司治理不好的樣本持有現金價值的2.75倍，故在好的治理機制下應該鼓勵過度自信的經理人持有較多的現金。
Cash is an asset featuring high currency and low return, while holding too much cash would result of opportunity cost, and idle cash indicates fewer investment opportunities. Whether the holding value of cash is higher than the intrinsic value of cash can reflect the operational performance of an enterprise.This study aims to probe into the effects of the managerial overconfidence and the governance mechanism of enterprises on the value of the cash holdings of enterprises.
According to the results of this empirical study, the overconfident managers would significantly reduce the value of cash holding, and the value of cash held by overconfident managers is lower than that by managers who are not overconfident.Moreover, the value of cash holding under an efficient governance mechanism is 2.28times that under an inefficient governance mechanism.An efficient governance mechanism of a company can increase the value of held cash to the level that the cash value is2.75 times more than the cash held under an inefficient governance mechanism. Therefore, managers with overconfidence should be encouraged to hold more cash in an efficient governance mechanism.
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