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題名：獎酬計畫與創新
書刊名：會計評論
作者：戚務君 引用關係／王泰昌 引用關係
作者(外文)：Chi, Wuh Jiun／Wang, Taychang
出版日期：2000
卷期：32
頁次：頁27-48
主題關鍵詞：訊息不對稱；誘因強度；機制設計；Information asymmetry；Incentive intensity；Mechanism design
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(3) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:3
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:47
期刊論文
1.Hart, Oliver D.、Moore, J.(1988)。Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation。Econometrica，56(4)，755-785。  new window
2.Janakiraman, S. N.、Lambert, R. A.、Larcker, D. F.(1992)。An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation Hypothesis。Journal of Accounting Research，30(1)，53-69。  new window
3.Holmström, Bengt(1982)。Moral Hazard in Teams。The Bell Journal of Economics，13(2)，324-340。  new window
4.Holmstrom, Bengt、Milgrom, Paul(1994)。The firm as an incentive system。American Economic Review，84(4)，972-991。  new window
5.Feltham, G. A.、Xie, J.(1994)。Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-task Principal/Agent Relations。The Accounting Review，69(3)，429-453。  new window
6.Scharfstein, David S.、Stein, Jeremy C.(1990)。Herd Behavior and Investment。The American Economic Review，80(3)，465-479。  new window
7.Banker, Rajiv D.、Datar, Srikant M.(1989)。Sensitivity, precision, and linear aggregation of signals for performance evaluation。Journal of Accounting Research，27(1)，21-39。  new window
8.Holmstrom, B.、Milgrom, P.(1991)。Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design。Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization，7，24-52。  new window
9.John, Teresa A.、John, Kose(1993)。Top-management Compensation and Capital Structure。Journal of Finance，48(3)，949-974。  new window
10.Hölmstrom, Bengt(1979)。Moral Hazard and Observability。The Bell Journal of Economics，10(1)，74-91。  new window
11.Jensen, Michael C.、Murphy, Kevin J.(1990)。Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives。Journal of Political Economy，98(2)，225-264。  new window
其他
1.G. Baker, M. Jensen and K. Murphy(1988)。Competition and incentives: Practice vs theory。  new window
2.J. A. Brickley, C. W. Smith and J. L. Zimmerman(1996)。Organizational Architecture: A Managerial Economics Approach: IRWIN。  new window
3.Garen, E. John(1994)。Executive compensation and principal-agent theory。  new window
4.S. J. Grossman and O. D. Hart(1983)。An analysis of the principle-agent problem。  new window
5.T. Hemmer(199503-05)。On the interrelation between production technology, job design, and incentives。  new window
6.B. Holmstrom and P. Milgrom(198703)。Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentive。  new window
7.W. Rogerson(198511)。The first order approach to the principal agent problem。  new window
8.J. C. Stein(198801)。Takeover threats and managerial myopia。  new window
9.J. L. Zimmerman(1997)。Accounting for Decision Making and Control。  new window
10.J. Zwiebel(1995)。Corporate conservatism and relative compensation。  new window
圖書論文
1.Jensen, M. C.、Meckling, W. H.(1992)。Specific and General Knowledge, and Organizational Structure。Main Currents in Contract Economics。Blackwell。  new window
 
 
 
 
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