Abstract The concept of particularity is generally confounded with the concept of partiality, by which it means the priority of moral concern to those near and dear. Look closely, the concept of particularity is ambiguous. If understood as particulars of a situation, particularity means exactly the same as partiality. However, if understood as sensitivity to the details and complexity of particular cases without the guidance of moral principles, particularity is different from partiality. The aim of this paper is to discuss partiality-based ethics and particularity-based ethics as two distinct and different moral theories. While the former is closely connected to care ethics which focuses on ethical notions of partiality, caring sensitivity and sympathy to the loved ones, the latter is known as moral particularism which, to use Dancy’s expression, looks hard at the details of the case before one with salient moral features. In order todemonstrate that the two moral theories belong to distinct and separate moral domains, a sexual harassment case is thoroughly discussed through the contrast between caring parents and competent (particularist) judge. Although care ethics and moral particularism are distinct and irreducible to each other, they are not incompatible. The paper argues the possibility of a complement through mutual enhancement. Although loving parents are as important in securing the well-being of the loved ones as competent judges in making right judgments in the moral court, they have much to learn from the other. In becoming the caring judge and being a reason-discerning parent, we learn how to care with good reasons and judge with sympathetic concern. After all, partiality and particularity should go hand in hand.