依據經濟合作發展組織 (OECD) 之調查報告書，指出競爭法主管當局實施寬恕政策，將有助於打擊諸如限制價格、限制產出或劃分市場等惡性卡特爾行為。蓋卡特爾行為具有密室謀議之特性，因此難以取得其違法事證，是以寬恕政策之實施，對於通報違法事證之卡特爾成員，給予減輕或免除制裁之獎勵，即有提昇競爭法主管機關發現及查處卡特爾之成效。 美國為首先採行寬恕政策之國家，隨之歐盟、德國、韓國及日本等國亦相繼採行。近年來，由於OECD會員國加重對於違法卡特爾之處罰，促使寬恕政策制度愈具實施功效。歸納該等競爭法主管機關之執法經驗，顯示寬恕政策許可減免處罰金額之條件愈趨於客觀明確者，愈有助益其政策實施之功效。 當前，我國公平交易委員會於其修法草案內，刻正研擬寬恕政策制度，是以本文嘗試探討各主要競爭法國家之制度措施，提供幾點參考建議:首先，修法草案應強化對於聯合行為之制裁措施，公平交易委員會並應訂定其罰鍰金額之計算準則；其次，實施子法應明確揭示免除或減輕罰鍰之制度適用標準，以促使涉案業者樂於提出申請；末者，公平交易委員會應調整對於同業公會實施聯合行為之處置，俾確保寬恕政策之實施成效。

A report by the OECD shows that the enforcement of leniency programs by competition law authorities can help to fight hard core cartels, which consist of agreements among competitors to fix prices, restrict output, or divide markets. Since by nature cartel conspiracy meetings might occur in a darkened room, it is difficult to collect evidence of illegal cartel activities. In order for the authorities to detect cartels and also make the ensuing investigations more effective, leniency programs grant a reduction in or exemption from sanctions in order to encourage cartel members to provide evidence regarding their c1andestinemeetings and communications. The U.S. was the first country to introduce a leniency program, to be later followed by the EU, Germany, South Korea, and Japan. These programs have become more successful in recent years because the penalties for cartel agreements have increased in some OECD countries. The evidence gathered by these authorities to date shows that the effectiveness of the program would be improved by an increase in the甘transparency and certainty of the conditions on which any exemption or reduction in fines or surcharges is to be granted. Presently, the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission is considering legislation to include a leniency program in the draft Amendment to the Fair Trade Law. Therefore, this paper attempts to discuss the merits and demerits of leniency programs among the main competition law countries. The concrete suggestions that arise out of this paper include the following: (1) The draft Amendment of the FTL should impose stronger sanctions against cartels, and the TFTC should enact a regulation on the method of setting penalties for cartel conduct. (2) A leniency program works best when the enforcement rules provide a clear standard of immunity or reduction in penalties for a conspirator to come forward. (3) To develop an effective leniency program, it is necessary for the TFTC to adjust the punishment against the cartel conduct of a trade association.