合作廣告是通路協調中的一種成本分攤與決策分享的機制，其中垂直式合作廣告指的是製造商與零售商或批發商與零售商共同分攤全國性與地區性廣告。在過去的文獻中，大部份對於合作廣告的研究，都聚焦在「製造商爲領導者、零售商爲跟隨者」的關係上。但是近年來，行銷通路出現了許多重大變革，隨著大型零售鏈的出現改變了以往製造商領導掛帥的通路生態，許多配銷通路的權力由製造商移轉到零售商身上，零售商權力逐漸抬頭，甚至凌駕製造商之上。基於此新市場趨勢，本文探討有關於製造商與零售商經由全國性廣告、地區性廣告與共同分擔廣告費用對於垂直式合作廣告效益的影響。在賽局理論方法部份，我們說明供應鏈賽局的結構會影響到製造商補貼策略以及零售商的地區性廣告，且文中將利用史塔克柏格均衡與聶許均衡觀念，來分析幾種不同的合作性廣告。最後，在求解出合作均衡解後，文中發現製造商與零售商二者的最佳策略會與賽局架構及邊際利潤有關。因此，本文藉由經濟學的角度來提供決策者更有效的廣告策略。

Cooperative advertising is one kind of channel coordination mechanism in marketing domain. Manufacturer and retailer with a supply chain must share common responsibility on national and local advertising for sales promotion activities. In the literature of cooperative advertising, the focus is almost on a relationship in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. Several reviews on market structure show that a shift of retailing power from manufacturer to retailers has occurred recently. Based on this new market shift we intend to explore the role of vertical cooperative efficiency with respect to transactions between a manufacturer and a retailer through national advertising, local advertising expenditures, and sharing rates of advertising expenses. In a game-theoretic setting, we show that different gaming structures in a supply chain might influence the manufacturer's subsidy policy and the retailer's local advertising expenditures. We borrow the concept from Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium to analyze several cooperative advertising games. After solving the cooperative equilibriums, we show that the strategies on both sides will depend not only on the gaming structure, but also on the marginal profit. Economic insight along with a lot of interesting propositions are subsequently provided to help decision makers develop more effective strategies.