Growth Opportunities, Agency Conflicts, and the Effectiveness of Busy Outside Directors_

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題名：	Growth Opportunities, Agency Conflicts, and the Effectiveness of Busy Outside Directors
書刊名：	財務金融學刊
作者：	陳家偉／Ninon, Sutton
作者(外文)：	Chen, Chia-wei
出版日期：	2009
卷期：	17:4
頁次：	頁123-151
主題關鍵詞：	董事兼任；董事會；代理衝突；Multiple directorships；Boards of directors；Agency costs
原始連結：	連回原系統網址
相關次數：	被引用次數:期刊(3) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0) 排除自我引用:3 共同引用:0 點閱:45

In this paper, we focus on potential tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of multiple directorships held by outside directors and attempt to determine how firm characteristics affect such tradeoffs. It is widely believed that outside directors of a firm play important functions of monitoring and advising. As a result, the basic hypothesis of this paper is that multiple directorships by outside directors can have different implications for firms that have different levels of monitoring and advising needs. Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings suggest that firm performance is positively associated with multiple directorships for firms with high growth opportunities and low agency conflicts. Such firms would benefit more from better advising while not suffering much from less monitoring. Likewise, firm performance is negatively associated with multiple directorships for firms likely with low growth opportunities and high agency conflicts.

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期刊論文
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研究報告
1.	Adams, Renée B.。The Dual role of Corporate Boards as Advisors and Monitors of Management: Theory and Evidence。
2.	Adams, Renée B.。What do Boards do? Evidence from Board Committee and Director Compensation Data。
3.	Ahn, Seoungpil、Jiraporn, Pornsit、Kim, Young Sang。Multiple Directorships and Acquirer Returns。

圖書
1.	Mace, Myles L.。Directors: Myth and Reality。Directors: Myth and Reality。Boston, MA。

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