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題名：經理人股權相關薪酬對違約風險的影響
書刊名：會計評論
作者：楊東曉 引用關係／蘇秋竹
作者(外文)：Yang, Tung-hsiao／Su, Chiu-chu
出版日期：2012
卷期：54
頁次：頁77-115
主題關鍵詞：經理人誘因效果；資本結構；違約風險；內生性；Executive incentives；Capital structure；Default risk；Endogeneity
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(3) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:3
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:58
本文利用Bharath and Shumway (2008)所提出之衡量違約機率的簡化模型，估計美國公開上市公司的違約機率，藉此探討公司經理人誘因效果對資本結構與違約風險的影響。實證結果顯示經理人持有公司的股數愈多，較易降低公司對外舉債的程度，經理人為了減少公司所面對的總風險與減緩還債壓力等原因，進而減少對外舉債的程度。值得一提的是在資本結構調整的過程當中，本文的實證結果發現經理人誘因效果，除了可透過影響資本結構，進而間接降低違約風險外，其對違約風險亦存在直接顯著的負向影響。最後，經理人薪酬的誘因效果對資本結構與違約風險的影響，主要來自公司股票持有的部分，並非來自股票選擇權的薪酬，此實證結果可彌補現有文獻上的不足，並提供往後相關研究議題的參考。
This paper analyzes the impact of the incentive effects on firm’s capital structure and default risk. Applying the measure of default probability in Bharath and Shumway (2008), we estimate the default probability for the public firms in the U.S. We focus on the impact of the incentive effects of stock-based compensation for top managers of each firm. The empirical results show that firms reduce their debt financing when they grant more stock to their executives. In addition, the results also show that the incentive effects would reduce the default probability directly after controlling the indirect impact of capital structure. Finally, only the incentive effects from the executive’s stock holding, however, do have a significant influence on capital structure and default probability. Because there is rare evidence in the literature on the impact of executive compensation on default risk, we contribute to the existing literature by providing the related empirical evidence on this issue.
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