本研究探討基金公司12b-1費用與銷售手續費使用對基金淨流量產生之不同影響。進一步探討，行銷費用對基金淨流量的影響，是否會因投資者屬性不同而不同。針對後者，我們採用兩種方法：（1）以基金過去流量－報酬率之敏感度作為基金投資者經驗豐富與否之代理變數；（2）選取部份樣本－資產保留率低並最後被合併之基金，探討此類基金合併前（剩餘之投資者績效敏感度低）及合併後（投資者類型增加），行銷費用對基金淨流量影響之改變情形。結果發現，12b-1費用對於基金淨流量有顯著正向影響，但銷售手續費則否。而12b-1費用對流量的影響，會因投資者對績效敏感度較高（低）而降低（增加）；資產保留率低之基金，12b-1費用對流量的影響在合併後亦下降。研究結果支持基金市場存在策略性定價及行銷。

This study examines the different effects of 12b-1 fees and sale loads on mutual fund flows. We also try to determine if the response of mutual fund flows to 12b-1 fees (or sale loads) is influenced by investor sophistication. We examine the latter issue by using past flow-to-performance sensitivity of a fund as the proxy variable for the fund’s investor sophistication. Alternatively, we chose a subset of funds characterized by low asset retention and subsequently being merged. The implication for funds with low asset retention is that most performance-sensitivity investors have migrated to other funds with better prospects, while the merging of funds implies a discrete shift in the fund’s investor base. We test for investor sophistication effects by analyzing the change in fund flows-to-fees relations after the merging of new shareholders. Our results indicate a positive relation between fund flows and 12b-1 fees, but no relation between flows and loads. In addition, the sensitivity of fund flows to 12b-1 fees will be lower for investors with higher performance sensitivity than for investors with the opposite attributes. Additionally, for funds with low asset retention we find a decrease in flows-to-12b-1 fees sensitivity after merging. We provide evidence to support ＂strategic fee setting and marketing＂ in the mutual fund industry.