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題名:審計品質與資訊不對稱之關聯性
書刊名:中華會計學刊
作者:王貞靜張瑀珊 引用關係林凱薰王泰昌 引用關係
作者(外文):Wang, Chen-chinChang, Yu-shanLin, Kai-hsun
出版日期:2012
卷期:8:1
頁次:頁89-140
主題關鍵詞:審計品質資訊不對稱優勢資訊交易機率Audit qualityInformation asymmetryProbability of information-based tradingPIN
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(6) 博士論文(1) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:6
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:15
本文旨在檢視審計品質與資訊不對稱之直接關聯。過去文獻多以審計品質作為資訊不對稱風險的代理變數,探討審計品質對資金成本的經濟影響,間接推論高審計品質隱含低資訊不對稱程度,能使企業資金成本下降。不同於過去文獻,本文採用優勢資訊交易機率(probability of information-based trading,簡稱PIN)擷取企業私有資訊交易的頻率,據此直接衡量企業資訊不對稱的程度;另以會計師事務所規模、會計師查核任期、裁決性應計數與審計市場產業專家作為審計品質的代理變數,實證結果證實審計品質確實能降低企業的資訊不對稱。本文填補了過去文獻尚未連結的部分,並且提出臺灣大型會計師事務所能降低企業資訊不對稱,具有較高的審計品質之實證證據。
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between audit quality and information asymmetry. Audit quality, the proxy variable representing information asymmetry widely in most studies, can affect firms' cost of capital. To differentiate from prior studies relating audit quality as the proxy variable, our study adopts probability of information-base trading (also named as PIN). PIN utilizes the possibility of informed traders trading stocks in capital market, as direct variable to evaluate the level of firm's information asymmetry. In addition, the size of audit firms, audit tenure, the discretionary accruals and the experts in audit market are also designed as proxy variables of audit quality. Based on empirical results, we prove that audit quality can significantly reduce information asymmetry. This study not only complements the linkages between audit quality and information asymmetry that prior studies didn't provide, but it also proves this with large audit firms in Taiwan, implying capability of higher audit quality, can effectively reduce information asymmetry.
期刊論文
1.Liu, C.、Wang. T.(2006)。Auditor liability and business investment。Contemporary Accounting Research,23(4),1051-1071。  new window
2.Narayanan, V. G.(1994)。An Analysis of Auditor Liability Rules。Journal of Accounting Research,32(Supplement),39-59。  new window
3.Chan, D. K.、Wong, K. P.(2002)。Scope of auditors' liability, audit quality, and capital investment。Review of Accounting Studies,7(1),97-122。  new window
4.Chan, Derek K.、Pae, Suil(1998)。An Analysis of the Economic Consequences of the Proportionate Liability Rule。Contemporary Accounting Research,15(4),457-480。  new window
5.Dye, R. A.(1995)。Incorporation and the audit market。Journal of Accounting and Economics,19(1),75-114。  new window
6.Frantz, Pascal(1999)。Auditor's Skill, Auditing Standards, Litigation, and Audit Quality。British Accounting Review,31(2),151-183。  new window
7.Hylton, Keith N.(2002)。An asymmetric-information model of litigation。International Review of Law and Economics,22(2),153-175。  new window
8.Pae, S.、Yoo, S. W.(2001)。Strategic interaction in auditing: An analysis of auditors' legal liability, internal control system quality, and audit effort。The Accounting Review,76(3),333-356。  new window
9.Palmrose, Z. V.(1997)。Who got sued?。Journal of Accountancy,183(3),67-69。  new window
10.Png, I. P. L.(1987)。Litigation, liability, and incentives for care。Journal of Public Economics,34(1),61-85。  new window
11.Radhakrishnan, Suresh(1999)。Investors' Recovery Friction and Auditor Liability Rules。The Accounting Review,74(2),225-240。  new window
12.Shavell, Steven(1982)。Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for Allocation of Legal Costs。Journal of Legal Studies,11(1),55-81。  new window
13.Zhang, Ping、Thoman, L.(1999)。Pre-Trial Settlement and the Value of Audits。The Accounting Review,74(4),473-491。  new window
14.Smith, Reed、Tidrick, Donald(1998)。The Effect of Alternative Judicial Systems and Settlement on Auditing。Review of Accounting Studies,2(4),353-381。  new window
15.Banks, Joel、Sobel, Jeffrey(1987)。Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games。Econometrica,55(3),647-661。  new window
16.Cho, I. K.、Kreps, D. M.(1987)。Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria。The Quarterly Journal of Economics,102(2),197-222。  new window
17.Dye, Ronald A.(1993)。Auditing standards, legal liability, and auditor wealth。Journal of political Economy,101(5),887-914。  new window
18.Schwartz, Rachel(1997)。Legal Regimes, Audit Quality and Investment。The Accounting Review,72(3),385-406。  new window
19.Hillegeist, Stephen A.(1999)。Financial Reporting and Auditing under Alternative Damage Apportionment Rules。The Accounting Review,74(3),347-369。  new window
20.Lee, C. J.、Liu, C.、Wang, T.(1999)。The 150-hour rule。Journal of Accounting and Economics,27(2),203-228。  new window
21.Kadous, K.(2000)。The Effects of Audit Quality and Consequence Severity on Juror Evaluations of Auditor Responsibility for Plaintiff Losses。The Accounting Review,75(3),327-341。  new window
22.Cook, J. M.、Freedman, E. M.,、Groves, R. J.、Madonna, J. C.(1992)。The liability crisis in the United States: Impact on the accounting profession。Journal of Accountancy,174(5),18-23。  new window
研究報告
1.Lee, H.、Wang, T.(2001)。Strategic auditing litigation and settlement under negligence liability。  new window
圖書
1.Fudenberg, Drew、Tirole, Jean(1991)。Game Theory。Cambridge, MA:MIT Press。  new window
其他
1.黃詩凱(20080412)。地雷股賠償,會計師負擔3%。  延伸查詢new window
2.Huang, Shi-Kai(20080412)。CPA must be liable for 3% of the damages resulting from the burst of a tank stock。  new window
 
 
 
 
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