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題名:A Re-examination of Collusion under Hard and Soft Information
書刊名:經濟研究. 臺北大學經濟學系
作者:邱敬淵 引用關係
作者(外文):Chiou, Jing-yuan
出版日期:2017
卷期:53:2
頁次:頁181-223
主題關鍵詞:事業誘因勾結硬性資訊軟性資訊Career concernsCollusionHard informationSoft information
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:2
期刊論文
1.Tirole, J.(1986)。Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: on the Role of Collusion in Organizations。The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,2(2),181-214。  new window
2.Faure-Grimaud, A.、Laffont, J. J.、Martimort, D.(2003)。Collusion, Delegation, and Supervision with Soft Information。Review of Economic Studies,70(2),253-279。  new window
3.Laffont, J.-J.、Martimort, D.(1997)。Collusion under Asymmetric Information。Econometrica,65(4),875-911。  new window
4.Dewatripont, Mathias、Tirole, Jean(2005)。Modes of Communication。Journal of Political Economy,113(6),1217-1238。  new window
5.Dessi, R.(2005)。Start-up Finance, Monitoring, and Collusion。The RAND Journal of Economics,36(2),255-274。  new window
6.Baliga, S.(1999)。Monitoring and Collusion with 'Soft' Information。The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,15(2),434-440。  new window
7.Holmström, B.(1999)。Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective。The Review of Economic Studies,66(1),169-182。  new window
8.Green, J. R.、Laffont, J. J.(1986)。Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design。The Review of Economic Studies,53(3),447-456。  new window
9.Frascatore, M. R.(1998)。Collusion in a Three-Tier Hierarchy: Credible Beliefs and Pure Self-Interest。Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,34(3),459-475。  new window
10.Kofman, Fred、Lawarrée, Jacques(1996)。On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion。Journal of Public Economics,61(3),383-407。  new window
11.Kofman, F.、Lawarrée, J.(1993)。Collusion in Hierarchical Agency。Econometrica,61(3),629-656。  new window
12.Koch, A. K.、Peyrache, E.(2011)。Aligning Ambition and Incentives。The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,27(3),655-688。  new window
13.Jeon, D. S.、Laffont, J. J.(1999)。The Efficient Mechanism for Downsizing the Public Sector。The World Bank Economic Review,13(1),67-88。  new window
14.Mukherjee, A.(2008)。Career Concerns, Matching, and Optimal Disclosure Policy。International Economic Review,49(4),1211-1250。  new window
15.Martimort, D.(1999)。The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs。The Review of Economic Studies,66(4),929-947。  new window
16.Lewis, T. R.、Sappington, D. E. M.(1989)。Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems。Journal of Economic Theory,49(2),294-313。  new window
17.Laffont, J. J.、Tirole, J.(1990)。Optimal Bypass and Cream Skimming。The American Economic Review,80(5),1042-1061。  new window
會議論文
1.Tirole, J.(1992)。Collusion and the Theory of Organizations。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。  new window
圖書
1.Chiou, J. Y.(2007)。Good News Only, Please: An (In-)Equivalence Result of Collusion under Hard and Soft Information。  new window
2.Felli, L.(1990)。Collusion in Incentive Contracts: Does Delegation Help?。  new window
3.Laffont, J. J.、Martimort, D.(2002)。The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model。Princeton University Press。  new window
4.Von Neumann, John、Morgenstern, Oskar(1944)。Theory of games and economic behavior。Princeton University Press。  new window
其他
1.Acemoglu, D.(1994)。A Dynamic Model of Collusion。  new window
 
 
 
 
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