| 期刊論文1. | Tirole, J.(1986)。Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: on the Role of Collusion in Organizations。The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,2(2),181-214。 | 2. | Faure-Grimaud, A.、Laffont, J. J.、Martimort, D.(2003)。Collusion, Delegation, and Supervision with Soft Information。Review of Economic Studies,70(2),253-279。 | 3. | Laffont, J.-J.、Martimort, D.(1997)。Collusion under Asymmetric Information。Econometrica,65(4),875-911。 | 4. | Dewatripont, Mathias、Tirole, Jean(2005)。Modes of Communication。Journal of Political Economy,113(6),1217-1238。 | 5. | Dessi, R.(2005)。Start-up Finance, Monitoring, and Collusion。The RAND Journal of Economics,36(2),255-274。 | 6. | Baliga, S.(1999)。Monitoring and Collusion with 'Soft' Information。The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,15(2),434-440。 | 7. | Holmström, B.(1999)。Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective。The Review of Economic Studies,66(1),169-182。 | 8. | Green, J. R.、Laffont, J. J.(1986)。Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design。The Review of Economic Studies,53(3),447-456。 | 9. | Frascatore, M. R.(1998)。Collusion in a Three-Tier Hierarchy: Credible Beliefs and Pure Self-Interest。Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,34(3),459-475。 | 10. | Kofman, Fred、Lawarrée, Jacques(1996)。On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion。Journal of Public Economics,61(3),383-407。 | 11. | Kofman, F.、Lawarrée, J.(1993)。Collusion in Hierarchical Agency。Econometrica,61(3),629-656。 | 12. | Koch, A. K.、Peyrache, E.(2011)。Aligning Ambition and Incentives。The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,27(3),655-688。 | 13. | Jeon, D. S.、Laffont, J. J.(1999)。The Efficient Mechanism for Downsizing the Public Sector。The World Bank Economic Review,13(1),67-88。 | 14. | Mukherjee, A.(2008)。Career Concerns, Matching, and Optimal Disclosure Policy。International Economic Review,49(4),1211-1250。 | 15. | Martimort, D.(1999)。The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs。The Review of Economic Studies,66(4),929-947。 | 16. | Lewis, T. R.、Sappington, D. E. M.(1989)。Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems。Journal of Economic Theory,49(2),294-313。 | 17. | Laffont, J. J.、Tirole, J.(1990)。Optimal Bypass and Cream Skimming。The American Economic Review,80(5),1042-1061。 | 會議論文1. | Tirole, J.(1992)。Collusion and the Theory of Organizations。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。 | 圖書1. | Chiou, J. Y.(2007)。Good News Only, Please: An (In-)Equivalence Result of Collusion under Hard and Soft Information。 | 2. | Felli, L.(1990)。Collusion in Incentive Contracts: Does Delegation Help?。 | 3. | Laffont, J. J.、Martimort, D.(2002)。The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model。Princeton University Press。 | 4. | Von Neumann, John、Morgenstern, Oskar(1944)。Theory of games and economic behavior。Princeton University Press。 | 其他1. | Acemoglu, D.(1994)。A Dynamic Model of Collusion。 | |