關於後衝突社會如何設計政治制度設計，既是重要的理論問題，在實務上也是政治工程師所面臨的重大挑戰。本文探討經歷族群嚴重衝突和內戰的國家，如何進一步設計其政治制度，並以波士尼亞與盧安達兩國所採權力分享模式的經驗進行探討和比較。這兩個案例均屬第二次世界大戰後所經歷最嚴重的種族屠殺，時間均在1990年代初期。再者，兩國均有不同程度的協商式民主制度實踐，迄今（2017年）均超過二十年的時間，故可供比較其權力分享制度經驗和效果。本研究發現，波士尼亞對三大族裔採權力均霑的同等原則和比例原則，惟其結果雖確保族群的代表性，但也鞏固了族群的界限，跨族群的合作仍不易強化。盧安達的情況，則是少數族群之圖西族相較胡圖族，取得超過其族群人口比例的政治權力，而政黨的公平競爭亦受到了較大的限制。換言之，兩國協商式民主的實踐均普遍不被認為成功，族群間仍潛在不安因素，但儘管如此，兩國近二十年來族群間未再重演之前的嚴重暴力衝突，也至少維持了一定的和平。

How to design the political system in a post-conflict society is an important theoretical issue, and also a difficult challenge for the political engineers. This paper, based on the experiences of Bosnia and Rwanda which have experienced serious ethnic conflict and civil war, discusses how the countries designed their political systems after the end of the conflict. These two countries have experienced the most serious ethnic conflicts since World War II, and these conflicts both took place in the early 1990s. Furthermore, over the past two decades both countries have adopted consociational democracatic systems in varying degrees after the conflict. Therefore I believe enough time has passed to evaluate their practices of power -sharing. The study found that in Bosnia the principles of proportionality and parity have been adopted, so as to ensure the power-sharing of the three ethnic groups. However, the political system paid the cost of consolidating existing ethnic boundaries, and it is still difficult for three ethnic groups to cooperate mutually. In Rwanda, compared to the Hutu majority, the Tutsi minority obtained political power which exceeds its ethnic population ratio. Besides, fair competition between political parties is also restricted. In other words, consociational democracy of the two countries was generally not considered to be successful. Nevertheless, Bosnia and Rwanda have at least maintained the peace and there have been no serious ethnic conflicts and violence for the past two decades.