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題名:機率證據與非常態證成
書刊名:東吳哲學學報
作者:張智皓
作者(外文):Jhang, Jhih-hao
出版日期:2018
卷期:38
頁次:頁73-114
主題關鍵詞:樂透悖論最小化風險概念多重前提封閉性原則機率證據Lottery paradoxThe risk minimization conception of justificationThe principle of multiple premise closure of justificationProbabilistic evidence
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(1) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:1
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:8
期刊論文
1.Nelkin, D. K.(2000)。The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality。The Philosophical Review,109(3),373-409。  new window
2.Turri, John(2010)。On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification。Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,80(2),312-326。  new window
3.Audi, R.(2013)。Knowledge, Justification, and the Normativity of Epistemology。Philosophical,90(2),127-145。  new window
4.Harman, G.(1968)。Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation。American Philosophical Quarterly,5(3),164-173。  new window
5.Kroedel, T.(2012)。The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility。Analysis,72(1),57-60。  new window
6.Mehta, N.(2015)。Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion Action and Belief A Teleological Account。Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,91(1),681-705。  new window
7.Nelson, M. T.(2002)。What Justification Could Not Be。International Journal of Philosophical Studies,10(3),265-281。  new window
8.Nelson, M.(2010)。We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties。Mind,119(473),83-102。  new window
9.Podlaskowski, A.、Smith, J.(2011)。Infinitism and Epistemic Normativity。Synthese,178(3),515-527。  new window
10.Shah, N.(2006)。A New Argument for Evidentialism。Philosophical Quarterly,56(225),481-498。  new window
11.Vahid, H.(2003)。Truth and the Aim of Epistemic Justification。TEOREMA: International Journal of Philosophy,20(3),83-91。  new window
12.Wedgwood, R.(2012)。Justified Inference。Synthese,189(2),1-23。  new window
13.Williamson, T.(1996)。Knowing and Asserting。Philosophical Review,105(4),489-523。  new window
14.Wedgwood, Ralph(2002)。The aim of belief。Philosophical Perspectives,16,267-297。  new window
圖書
1.Williamson, Timothy(2000)。Knowledge and Its Limits。Oxford:Oxford University Press。  new window
2.Kyburg, H.(1961)。Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief。Middletown:Wesleyan University Press。  new window
3.Williams, Bernard(1973)。Problems of the Self。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。  new window
4.Smith, M.(2016)。Between Probability and Certainty。Oxford:Oxford University Press。  new window
其他
1.Strevens, M.(2012)。Note on Bayesian Confirmation Theory,http://www.iiyu.edu/classes/strevens/BCT/BCT.pdf。  new window
圖書論文
1.DeRose, K.(1999)。Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense。The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology。Oxford:Blackwell Publishers。  new window
2.Vogel, J.(2010)。Lottery Paradox。A Companion to Epistemology。Malden, Massachusetts:Wiley-Blackwell。  new window
 
 
 
 
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