大陸自一九九四年一月一日起實行分稅制，主要政策目的之一，即為提 高中央財政收入佔總財政收入比例(相對亦即降低地方財政收入比例)，因 此，分稅制對中央與地方財政關係的衝擊，非常值得吾人重視。然而，一九 九三年底在中央與地方對分稅制討價還價的過程中，卻戲劇性產生了奇特的 保障地方既得利益的稅收返還措施，稅收返還也就成為中國大陸分稅制中最 具關鍵性的變數。一九九四年以後，中央表面上暴增的財政預算收入，其實 是嚴重虛胖的；扣除必須返還給地方政府的數額之後，中央實際可支配的財 政預算收入，佔總財政預算收入的比例，一九九三年佔23.3％、一九九四年 佔20.84％、一九九六年佔20.82％，結果不升反降，沒有達成預期效果。此 外，分稅制竟帶來了全國財政赤字倍增的負面作用；而分稅制的實施，也仍 難以規範各級政府變相汲取財政收入的行為。

　　　　　The People's Republic of China has maintained the dividing tax system since January 1st 1994. The most important purpose behind this system was to raise the ratio of the central vs. local state revenues, and thus had a significant impact on central--local state financial relations. After 1994, the percentage of national revenue flowing to the center declined from 23.3% in 1993 to 20.84% in 1994 and then to 20.82% in 1996. These outcomes show the failure of the dividing tax system to raise the ratio of the central state revenues. Moreover, the dividing tax system created more serious deficits as negative effects and the unofficial financial practices of the government have remained undefined.