本研究應用犯罪經濟學中的威懾理論,考察了高管腐敗曝光對可比企業高管超額在職消費的威懾效應。基于2008-2015年A股國有上市公司數據的實證結果,我們發現高管腐敗曝光對同省份或同行業企業的超額在職消費行為有一定威懾作用。被曝光企業規模越大,懲罰力度越高,威懾效應越明顯。可比企業原有腐敗水平越高,公司治理質量越差,威懾效應越明顯。進一步研究發現,曝光作為一種外部機制能夠改善同行業可比企業的未來業績。本研究拓展了威懾效應理論在微觀實證領域的研究,對于客觀評價高壓反腐的政策實施效果也具有一定參考價值。

Based on deterrent theory in crime economics,this paper examines the deterrent effect of top-executive corruption exposure on peer firm executives’ excess perquisites in the capital market. Using sample of Chinese listed state-owned enterprises on A stock market during years 2008-2015,the empirical results show that to a certain extent the deterrent effect exists within the same province or the same industry. The characteristics of both the exposed firms and peer firms can exert significant influence on the extent of such effect. Specifically,this relationship is more eminent when the exposed firm is larger or the penalties are stronger. Besides,as for the peer firm,this relationship is more significant when its degree of original corruption is higher or its internal governance quality is worse. Further result shows that as an external mechanism,the exposure can improve the future performance of peer firms in the same industry. This study extends the studies of crime deterrent effect in micro empirical research and is of valuable reference when making objective evaluation of the effects of anti-corruption campaign.