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題名：創業投資契約中道德風險與逆選擇問題之研究
作者：童桂馨
作者(外文)：Gu-shin Tung
校院名稱：國立中山大學
系所名稱：企業管理學系研究所
指導教授：劉維琪
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2004
主題關鍵詞：創業投資；逆選擇；道德風險；venture capital；moral hazard；adverse selection.
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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摘要
本研究欲將創投與創業家的代理問題，從單一創投與單一創業家的代理問題擴展至單一創投與多重創業家及多重創投與單一創業家。
本研究的第一個研究目的，旨在比較單一創業家與單一創投所簽訂的普通股契約與可轉換債權契約，在道德風險發生時，雙方付出的努力程度。結果發現：(1)無論是普通股契約或可轉換債權契約，雙方道德風險之下，創投與創業家付出的努力水準皆低於充分訊息的狀況；(2)無論是在充分訊息或雙方道德風險的狀況，創投與創業家付出的努力水準，可轉換債權契約皆優於普通股契約；(3)當雙方無道德風險存在時，創投所付出的資金成本等於其可得的淨利潤。
本研究的第二個研究目的，將創業家擴充為兩位，釐清兩位創業家與一位創投之間雙方道德風險的問題。結果發現：(1)雙方道德風險之下，創投與兩位創業家付出的努力水準皆低於充分訊息的狀況；(2)普通股契約之下，創投與多重創業家會產生道德風險；(3)為解決雙方道德風險問題，計畫案的總價值需有條件由創投與兩位創業家分享，則單一創投與多重創業家的道德風險可消弭。
本研究第三個研究目的，討論兩位創投聯合投資ㄧ位創業家的問題，當創業家知道計畫案的潛在獲利能力，但是兩位創投並未如創業家知悉計畫案的獲利能力。結果發現：(1)當創業家願意揭露私有訊息時，創投無論是否合作，其管理成本皆相同；(2)若創業家不願意揭露私有訊息時，兩位創投不合作的管理成本較合作成本高；(3)若創業家不願意揭露私有訊息時，創投投入的努力水準，替代性質的管理行為高於互補性質。
關鍵字：創業投資、道德風險、逆選擇
Venture Capital Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Abstract
This study offers a discussion on the agency theory of venture capital, including the cases of one venture capitalist and one entrepreneur, one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs, and two venture capitalists and one entrepreneur.
The first model compares the effort levels of the two parties, one venture capitalist and one entrepreneur, when there is a double moral hazard problem. The results are as follows:(1)the effort levels under double moral hazard are lower than those under full information，no matter if the contract is common stock or convertible debt ; (2) a suitably chosen convertible debt contract outperforms a common stock contract; and (3) in the equilibrium, the venture capitalist’s net compensation is equal to his cost of capital.
Secondly, the study extends to a double side moral hazard problem between one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs. The results show: (1) the effort levels under double moral hazard are still lower than those under full information in the model; (2) one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs will come up with a double moral hazard problem if they sign the common stock contract; and (3) the incentive to lessen the double moral hazard problem is the total profit shared conditionally by one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs.
Finally, this study develops a joint investment framework with an adverse selection problem. One entrepreneur is informed about the project’s potential profitability but two venture capitalists are not .The results show:(1)if the entrepreneur reveals his private information, the individual management cost of two venture capitalists will be equal; (2)if the entrepreneur does not reveal his private information, the individual management cost of the two venture capitalists will be higher in an uncooperative situation; and (3)if the entrepreneur does not reveal his private information, the venture capitalists’ effort levels will be higher in case their management knowledge is of substitutive nature than that of complementary nature.
Key words：venture capital, moral hazard, adverse selection
參考文獻

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