:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
題名:耐久財貿易與研發政策分析
作者:蔡建樹
作者(外文):Chien-shu Tsai
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:國際經濟所
指導教授:陳芳岳
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2007
主題關鍵詞:對外投資研發政策耐久性設備耐久財策略性貿易政策foreign direct investmentR & D policydurable equipmentsdurable goodsstrategic trade policy
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:18
本文共分三個研究主題,分別是「耐久財之最適貿易政策」、「耐久性設備之貿易與研發政策分析」與「耐久性設備研發政策與對外投資分析」三部份。
第二章為「耐久財之最適貿易政策」,分別討論進、出口國面對耐久財的貿易政策。利用耐久財的兩期模型我們發現,進口國應允陸磪~獨佔廠商進入本國市場,並且課徵最適關稅。我們證明不論是進口國採取單一關稅,或施行時間一致性的跨期差別關稅,最適政策均使得國外獨佔廠商在各期皆提供耐久財。我們進一步得證由於單一關稅利潤奪取的幅度較大,所以單一關稅較跨期差別關稅更能提高進口國福利。最後,我們證明出口國具時間一致性的最適出口政策為在兩期中均對耐久財出口課稅,以提昇社會福利,而最適跨期差別出口稅甚至可以使得耐久財出口廠商只生產第一期產品,廠商以類似出租耐久財的方式經營,取得兩期獨佔利潤,出口國社會福利水準因而達到最大。
第三章為「耐久性設備之貿易與研發政策分析」,在垂直相關市場中,本文以兩期模型探討耐久性機器設備之進口貿易政策,並研究提昇耐久性機器設備品質之研發補貼政策對本國社會福利的影響。我們假設在第二期國外新型機器設備廠商會進入本國市場與本國舊型機器設備廠商競爭,且本國異質性的最終財廠商在第二期會使用舊型機器設備對外投資。我們證明本國在第二期需對進口耐久性設備課稅;並且舊型機器設備品質水準與關稅具負向相關;我們也得證,本國需補貼耐久性機器設備之研發活動以提高社會福利,而本國機器設備廠商則會在第一期生產第一、二期所需之機器設備。
第四章為「耐久性設備研發政策與對外投資分析」,在兩期模型中,當面對勞動成本上升的情形下,具有耐久性的機器設備其耐久度,會影響以此機器設備作為生產投入之最終財廠商對外投資的決策。如果廠商選擇對外投資,則進口機器設備的關稅高低,會影響是否要保留國內廠並進口新型機器設備繼續生產的決策,當關稅過高,最終財廠商會因成本考量而關閉國內廠,只以本國產製機器設備對外投資。若第一期本國機器設備的研發享有相當高的補貼時,最終財廠商第二期會選擇對外投資且關閉國內廠。否則,對外投資就會保留國內廠,並引進國外新型機器設備,以異質化其產品擴大第二期之利潤。此外,不論對外投資是否保留國內廠,第一期耐久設備最適研發補貼的大小,則會受到市場規模擴大程度與國內、外相對勞動成本高低的正面影響。
none.
翁永和、劉碧珍與李長邑 (1998), 垂直整合、出口補貼與技術選擇, 經濟研究 35(2), 119-138。new window
蔡宜臻與邱俊榮 (2007), 對外直接投資與研究發展, 經濟論文 35(1), 53-82.
Bond, E. (1983), Trade in Used Equipment with Heterogeneous Firms, Journal of Political Economy 91(4), 688-705.
Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer (1984a), Trade Welfare: Tariffs and Cartels, Journal of International Economics 16(3-4), 227-242.
Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer (1984b), Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition, in H. Kierzkowski, ed., Monopolistic Competition and International Trade, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Bulow, J. I. (1982), Durable-goods Monopolists, Journal of Political Economy 90(2), 314-332.
Bulow, J. I. (1986), An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(4), 729-749.
Bulow, J. I., J. D. Geanakoplos and P. D. Klemperer (1985), Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, Journal of Political Economy 93(3), 488-511.
Butz, David A. (1990), Durable-Good Monopoly and Best-Price Provisions, American Economic Review 80(5), 1062-1076.
Chen, Hsiu-Li (2000), On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas with Endogenous Technology Choice, Journal of Economic Development 25(2), 55-67.
Choi, J. P. (1995), Optimal Tariffs and the Choice of Technology: Discriminatory Tariffs vs. the ‘Most Favored Nation’ Clause, Journal of International Economics 38(1-2), 143-160.
Coase, R. H. (1972), Durability and Monopoly, Journal of Law and Economic 15(1), 143-149.
DeGraba, P. (1990), Input Market Price Discrimination and the Choice of Technology, American Economic Review 80(5), 1246-1253.
Driskill, Robert A. and Andrew W. Horowitz (1996), Durability and Strategic Trade: Are there Rents to be Captured? , Journal of International Economics 46(1-2), 179-194.
Goering, Gregory E. and Michael K. Pippenger (2000), International Trade and Commercial Policy for Durable Goods, Review of International Economics 8(2), 275-294.
Goldberg, P. K. (1995), Strategic Export Promotion in the Absence of Government Precommitment, International Economic Review 36(2), 407-426.
Karp, L. And J. Perloff (1995), Why Industrial Policies Fail: Limited Commitment, International Economic Review 36(4), 887-905.
Karp, L. And J. Perloff (1996), The Optimal Suppression of a Low-Cost Technology by a Durable-Good Monopoly, Rand Journal of Economics 27(2), 346-364.
Kuo, H-I and H. Hwang (1991), Discriminatory Tariffs versus Uniform Tariffs, Academia Economic Papers 19(2), 233-245.
Lee, Jaewoo (1998), Intertemporal Substitution in Imported Durables, Journal of International Economics 44(1), 113-133.
Maskin, E. and D. Newbery (1990), Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency, American Economic Review 80(1), 143-156.
Motta, Massimo (1993), Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition, Journal of Industrial Economics 41(2), 113-131.
Navaretti, G. B., I. Soloaga and W. Takacs (1998), Bargains Rejected? Developing Country Trade Policy on Used Equipment, Labour 12(2), 353-362.
Petit, M.L. and F. Sanna-Randaccio (1998), Technological Innovation and Multinational Expansion: A Two-Way Link? , Journal of Economics 68(1), 1-26.
Petit, M.L. and F. Sanna-Randaccio (2000), Endogenous R&D and Foreign Direct Investment in International Oligopolies, International Journal of Industrial Organization 18(2), 339-367.
Shy, O. (1995), Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Spencer, B. and J. A. Brander (1983), International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy, Review of Economic Studies 50(4), 707-722.
Spencer, B. and R. Jones (1991), Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade, Review of Economic Studies 58(1), 153-170.
Spencer, B. and R. Jones (1992), Trade and Protection in Vertically Related Markets, Journal of International Economics 32(1), 31-55.
Tiroe, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
UNCTAD (2006), World Investment Report, United Nations, New York and Geneva.
Wade, R. (2004), Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Waldman, Michael. (2003), Durable Goods Theory for Real World Market, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(1), 131-154.
Wang, J.-Y. and M. Blomstrom (1992), Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer: A Simple Model, European Economic Review 36(1),137-155
Zhou, D., B. Spencer and I. Vertinsky (2002), Strategic Trade Policy with Endogenous Choice of Quality and Asymmetric Costs, Journal of International Economics 56(1), 205-232.
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top