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題名：風險趨避與保險契約
作者：楊振昇
作者(外文)：Chen-sheng Yang
校院名稱：逢甲大學
系所名稱：經濟學所
指導教授：利菊秀
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2007
主題關鍵詞：tax deduction policy；adverse selection；advantageous selection；risk aversion；single-crossing property；transaction costs
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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The problem of adverse selection on markets is an important issue in recent economics literature. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) provide a framework for studying this problem in insurance markets. The insurer will provide full insurance to high-risk individuals and partial insurance to low-risk individuals. This implies positive correlation between risk levels and insurance coverage.
According to the framework of R-S model, many empirical studies try to test the presence of adverse selection. However, only few empirical studies can reveal the evidence of adverse selection. An important role is ignored. That is the degree of risk aversion. Individuals with more risk aversion will purchase more insurance coverage. The insurance price also affects consumers’ demand for insurance. Therefore, this paper extends the R-S model on heterogeneity in risk aversion and on the effect of loading in the insurance markets. Low-risk individuals are more risk averse than high-risk individuals.
This paper finds that a pooling equilibrium is possible in the monopoly and competitive markets. More importantly, an advantageous selection will be possible and low-risk individuals will purchase more insurance coverage than high-risk individuals when the difference in risk aversion is sufficiently large. The insurers will offer a pair of contracts with cross-subsidization from the low- to the high-risk group in the competitive market with loading. These results change the proposition of R-S model and provide an explanation for the problem of advantageous selection.
This article further studies the tax deduction system. The result of this paper expresses that through tax deductions the government creates cross subsidization which may increase the separating equilibrium but cannot be fully accomplished. The pooling equilibrium and advantageous selection may exist when the preferences satisfy double-crossing property. Moreover, this paper also shows that under two systems in equilibrium (tax deduction system and no-tax deduction system), if high-risk individuals under certain restrictions and better off in one system, then low-risk individuals are also better off in the same system: tax deduction system.
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