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題名：代理人角色與我國銀行要素使用及配置效率分析
作者：江宗良
作者(外文)：Zong-Liang Jiang
校院名稱：東吳大學
系所名稱：經濟學系
指導教授：傅祖壇
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2007
主題關鍵詞：代理人；配置無效率；投入距離函數；銀行；隨機邊界；agent；allocative inefficiency；input distance function；bank；stochastic frontier
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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現代企業的所有權與管理權已經分離，管理企業的經理人極大化個人效用而非擁有企業的股東效用因此發生代理問題，產生代理成本，企業成本未達極小化。由於政府控制與民營銀行在經營目標、組織架構、法令規範等有很大的不同，使得經理人的角色與行為亦明顯差異而表現在要素使用與配置效率。本文利用1984至2001年我國12家政府控制銀行及28家民營銀行為樣本，以要素使用隨機邊界模型及投入距離函數聯立模型求出要素使用無效率、絕對配置無效率、相對配置無效率。所得結果歸納如下：
一、要素使用隨機邊界模型：民營銀行經理人在資本使用較政府控制銀行經理人無效率，而在勞動及資金使用效率優於政府控制銀行，整體平均而言，勞動與資金使用逐漸接近效率水準。
二、投入距離函數聯立模型：(一)政府控制銀行與民營銀行經理人偏好傾向相同，即資本投入過多，勞動、資金投入不足，資金相對於勞動則以資金投入過多，就程度而言，民營銀行經理人在配置效率優於政府控制銀行的經理人。(二)政府控制銀行經理人在政府的保護下，自有資本配置不足，而民營銀行的自有資本配置已達最適水準。
為了使我國銀行業更具效率，建議銀行經理人必須減少資本的使用量，而在銀行競爭越趨激烈，政府逐漸民營化時，政府控制銀行經理人必須增加自有資本的投入量，以保持銀行的安全性。
The contemporary enterprises now have separated their possession and management. The managers probably try to maximize their own utilities but not those of the stockholders. Therefore it comes the so-called principal-agent problem. With the agent cost, the enterprises cannot minimize their running cost. Because of the different running visions, organization structures and application of regulations between government-controlled and private banks, the roles that the managers play in the both kinds of banks significantly differ in the usage factors and allocative efficiency. By means of the stochastic frontier model of factor usage and the simultaneous model of input distance function, this article takes 12 government-controlled banks and 28 private ones from 1984-2001 as samples to figure out inefficiency in factor usage, absolute allocation and relative allocation. The results are summarized as follows:
I. The stochastic frontier model of factor usage: the managers in private banks seem to be less efficient in using capital than the ones in government-controlled banks. However, the former are more efficient than the latter in using labor and fund. Generally speaking, both banks’ usage of labor and fund is gradually approaching the efficient level.
II. The simultaneous model of input distance function:
A. The managers’ preference tendencies in both types of banks are alike. Both managers put excess capital but insufficient labor and fund-fund input hereinbefore is relatively more than labor. To some degree, the managers in private banks are better than government-controlled ones in allocative efficiency.
B. The managers in private banks allocate their equity to the optimum level. Due to the protection by the government, however, the ones in the government-controlled banks do not have sufficient self-owed equity capital to allocate.
In order to make banks in Taiwan more efficient, I hereby suggest that both bank managers reduce the capital input. While competition among banks become ever fierce and public enterprises tend to gradually privatize, the managers who work for the government-controlled banks must increase the input of their own equity capital so as to keep the banks securer.
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