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題名：理由與價值：評雷茲的理由論
作者：蕭郁雯
作者(外文)：Yu-wen Hsiao
校院名稱：國立中正大學
系所名稱：哲學所
指導教授：謝世民
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2009
主題關鍵詞：主體相對理由；意志薄弱；主體中立理由；客觀性；價值來源；動機；價值論；理由；價值；實踐理性；雷茲；欲望論；普遍主義；理由判斷的普遍性；value；generalism；weakness of will；reason；desire-based theory；objectivity；the universality of reason judgment；agent-neutral reason；agent-relatvie reason；motivation；value-based theory；the source of value；joseph raz；practical reason
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本論文辯護雷茲的實踐理性論（理由論）。與實踐理性有關的討論可以分成三大項，一是理由與動機的關係，二是實踐理性與價值的關係，三是主體的理由與其他人理由的關係。雷茲的理由論對這三項議題都有觸及，尤其針對第二項議題有比較深入的討論。針對理由與動機關係，雷茲認為當我們理清評價者與價值之間的關係後，並不需要再預設額外的欲望，就能說明為何我們要追求價值。針對第三項議題，他並沒有直接處理，但這可以從他對另一組作為理由與後果理由這區分的討論來陳明。而本論文的貢獻乃在說明雷茲的理論過程中，批評、修正、補充他的理論，使他的理論更臻完備。因為，雷茲的理由論大部分是正確的。
針對第一部份理由與動機的關係，本論文同意欲望並不提供行動理由的主張，但是，本論文進一步提出「行為人有理由做什麼的一般條件」此正面論述，此一般條件的陳述乃區分了理由成立(reasons in general)與理由適用(reasons application)。此外，雷茲主張行動理由是具有規範意義的事實，因此，理由是客觀的，但他對於客觀性的看法不同於威廉斯以交集多寡來決定，因此不是一種純粹觀點下的客觀；也不同於內格爾以不需某種特殊結構也能理解的方式來決定；而是以有真假可言(domain objectivity)來決定。
針對第二部份實踐理性與價值的關係，雷茲認為行動與事態的價值並不是由主體的選擇決定，而是人們發現的。
此外，雷茲主張行動理由是由價值提供，主體能夠理解自己的行動，是因為他知道自己的行動好在哪裡，這主張受到不少反對。在本論文中，我討論四項針對這主張的反對意見。
針對第三部份主體的理由與其他人理由的關係，這項議題可以從兩方面來理解。一是理由的特徵是普遍的還是個別的，我辯護雷茲對理由的特徵是普遍的主張。因此，如果在情況C中，主體有做A的理由，則這蘊含其他人在類似於情況C的狀況中，可以找到普遍的特徵作為他做A的理由。二是主體中立理由與主體相對理由之爭論。這部份雷茲沒有直接討論，但是他以另一項區分來反對主體中立與主體相對理由，因此我在論文深入討論這兩項區分。
最後，在實踐理性討論中，什麼是不理性的，也一直受到哲學家討論，因此我也延伸雷茲對意志的看法，指出意志薄弱應該如何理解比較恰當。
In this thesis, I attempt to defend Joseph Raz’s theory of practical reason or his theory of reason. The issues surrounding practical reason can be divided into three main parts. The first part concerns the relations between reasons and motivation, the second part concern issues arising from practical reason and value, and the last part concerns the relations between an agent’s reasons and other agents’ reasons.
Raz has his claims and defenses with regard to these three issues, especially with regard to the second issue, he has penetrating discussion. As to the first issue, the relations between reasons and motivation, Raz defends a view of value theory. He thinks that we can, in virtue of clarification on the relationships between evaluators and values, explain why people pursue values without appealing to people’s desires. However, Raz does not deal with the third issue directly, but that is not a disadvantage because we can find his position from another distinction he uses. The contribution of the thesis lies in the revision, criticism, expansion of Raz’s theory of reason. That is a contribution because Raz’s theory is mainly in the right direction.
With regard to the relation between reasons and motivation, I agree with Raz that desires do not provide reasons for action. But I further propose a distinction between ‘reasons in general’ and ‘reasons application’ to explain the general condition of when agents have reason to do what. Also Raz defends a view of reasons for action where reasons are provided by normatively significant facts. Hence, reasons are objective for Raz. However, his explanation of objectivity is different from those of Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel. Raz proposes the so-called domain objectivity, which is different from the objectivity of convergence(Williams’s position), and also different from the objectivity from no particular point of view(Nagel’s position).
With regard to the relations between practical reason and value, Raz thinks that the values of action or state of affairs are not determined by agents’ choices, rather, they are discovered in human societies.
In addition, Raz claims that reasons for actions are provided by the values of those actions. Agents can understand their actions through their reasons where they know what is good of doing those actions. Such position is facing at least four oppositions, and I attempt to allay the rival positions in my thesis.
Finally, with regard to the relations between an agent’ reason and other agents’ reason, I deal with them in two ways. First, I discuss whether the features of reasons are universal or particular. In this wake, I defend the former position. If in circumstance C, agent S has reason to do A, then it implies that other agents in the similar circumstance can find some features which are universal to be his reason to do A. Second, I discuss whether the distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons makes sense.
In addition, what counts as irrationality is not ignored in the discussion of practical reason. In this regard, I apply Raz’s view on will and try to say something about weakness of will. I indicate that the weakness of will had better be understood from the following way: weakness of will is displayed in an agent when he violates his better judgment, and he has weakness of will because has that character traits.
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