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題名：官僚腐敗與金融危機關係之研究
作者：陳秋文
作者(外文)：CHEN CHIU WEN
校院名稱：中國文化大學
系所名稱：經濟學研究所
指導教授：胡春田
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2008
主題關鍵詞：官僚貪腐；金融危機；外債；金融監理；資本管制；肅貪查賄；corruption；financial crisis；foreign currency debt；financial supervision；capital control；chasing corruption
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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近年來在新興國家的經濟成長過程中，尤其是亞洲國家，一方面以追求高產出為目標，另一方面卻容易受制於政經體制的官僚貪腐所影響；在亞洲金融危機之後，官僚貪腐之議題，再次獲國際社會的關注。因此，本文係以官僚貪腐與金融危機關係為主題，研究貪腐賄賂對經濟面的影響，及其是否是導致金融危機之要因，與對金融危機下的政策效果作一探討。
本文試圖藉由一個簡單的小型開放經濟體系模型，以探討官僚腐敗和金融危機間的關係。在本文中可得：一、在經濟體系將貪腐賄賂因素納入開放的經濟體系模型中，可發現匯率的變動對預期產出的影響，有行賄的企業之產出變動大於無行賄者。二、在官僚貪腐的經濟體系中，民眾若看好未來經濟，在此情況下，可發現在貪腐賄賂經濟體系的均衡解，將有較高的下期產出與較低的本期匯率發生。三、在官僚貪腐的經濟體系中，民眾若看壞未來經濟，則經濟體系將可能因貪腐賄賂之因素爆發生金融危機。四、生產力衝擊對有、無官僚貪腐經濟體系的影響，若有負的未預期生產力衝擊後，則可知有貪腐的經濟體系較無貪腐者易引發金融危機，反之，當經濟體系原處於壞的均衡解情況下，若有正的生產力衝擊後，則可發現有貪腐的經濟體系較無貪腐者易從危機中恢復正常。五、政府肅貪查賄之政策，若經濟體系發生金融危機時，政府肅貪查賄之政策是可改善體系的匯率與產出之效果；但若體系處於景氣繁融時期，政府肅貪查賄行動，將對體系的匯率與產出造成反面效應。六、經濟體系在官僚貪腐下，當局以緊縮貨幣政策來改善金融危機的產出效果應是一可期之對策。七、政府加強金融監理之政策，經濟體系在資產市場方面需處於低匯率時，對改善經濟體系的匯率與產出之目標方較能達成政策效果。八、政府當局對金融危機發生後的經濟體系，若短期採取加強資本管制之政策，應可有效降低本期匯率及提升經濟體系的產出。
綜上所述，官僚貪腐在經濟體系的影響效果，應是有正有負，尤如同雙面刃。在民眾看好未來經濟時，官僚貪腐對經濟體系中的產出有如同「錦上添花」之效果；但在在民眾看壞未來經濟時，官僚貪腐對體系中的產出有如同「落井下石」之效果，甚至使經濟體系較容易引發金融危機。
Abstract
In the last decade, the countries in the emerging market economies (especially the Asia countries) demonstrate the combination of rapid growth and serious corruption, it brings cruel cost and effect upon economic development of a country. The issue of corruption has been a matter of hot debate among academics and policy makers after the Asian Crisis. This research will attempt to examine the relationship between the corruption and financial crisis in an open economy and the right response to the financial crisis by the authorities adopted.
In this paper we apply a small open economy model into the study on the issue of corruption and financial crisis. The conclusion obtained in this research includes:
1.We indicate that the bribery of corruption in an open economy will lead to lots of the change of output on the firm sector rather than a none-bribery economy.
2.If people will anticipate that expected output is high in corruption economy, in this situation, it will find that the equilibrium in corruption economy leads to the ‘good” case, with high output and an exchange rate appreciation.
3.If people will anticipate that expected output is low in corruption economy, it will show that the equilibrium in corruption economy leads to the ‘bad” case, with low output and an exchange rate depreciation. This case occurs, that is, the corruption in economy will lead easily to a financial crisis.
4.Suppose that the economy is hit by an unexpected shock, if the unexpected shock is negative it may easily lead to a financial crisis in corruption economy rather than none-corruption economy. On the other hand, if the unexpected shock is positive, corruption will increase the output level and make the currency appreciation, that is, a situation that the crisis in corruption economy may easily lead to a ‘normal’ economic situation rather than none-corruption economy.
5.The implementation of chasing corruption has an ambiguous effect on firms since it makes more difficult to borrow and may decrease the foreign currency debt burden. In a word, chasing corruption mechanisms will lead to the increase of output after crisis, that is, chasing corruption is beneficial for economic development. Moreover, if the economy is prosperous chasing corruption is harmful for economic growth.
6.A standard recommendation (the monetary authority) is through a decrease in money supply after crisis, in which case monetary tightening will have an overall positive impact on equilibrium output. That’s to say, monetary tightening might eliminate the financial crisis and be the right policy to follow.
7.We show that it is somewhat ambiguous effect on improvement of financial crisis by strengthening the financial supervision by policy authority in the open economy.
8.We also indicate that capital control by policy authority might eliminate the financial crisis and lead to an appreciation and to a subsequent increase in output in the good equilibrium.
In conclusion, the results show that corruption is a double edged sword, that is, the corruption has an ambiguous effect in the open economy. If the economy is prosperous, the corruption may grease the economic system and infuse some motive power into the economic activities during the processes of growth; nevertheless, if the economy is recession, the corruption may turn to be an obstacle to the growth of economy, furthermore, to easily lead to a financial crisis.
Keywords: financial crisis, corruption, foreign currency debt, financial supervision, capital control.
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