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題名：公司併購政策與股票購回策略之影響因素
作者：李芸綺
作者(外文)：Yun-chi Lee
校院名稱：國立中央大學
系所名稱：財務金融研究所
指導教授：葉錦徽
周冠男
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2011
主題關鍵詞：自願性揭露；股票購回；公司治理；時間策略；付款方式；併購；Voluntary Disclosures；Share Repurchases；Corporate Governance；Payment method；Timing strategy；Acquisitions
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本研究由兩篇關於經理人行為的主題所構成，包括併購宣告的時間策略與股票購回前公司治理對自願性揭露的影響。
第一篇文章探討併購者併購宣告的時間策略與付款方式對目標公司報酬與潛在競爭者的效果。本篇文章利用交易時間與非交易時間的併購宣告來檢定併購者併購宣告的時間策略，如何使得付款方式對於目標公司股價報酬與潛在競爭者的影響有所不同。我們發現在非交易時間的併購宣告，現金付款方式對於併購溢酬以及目標公司報酬有顯著為正的影響，但這些結果在交易時間的併購宣告並不存在。在非交易時間的併購宣告中，現金付款方式也比較能夠阻止潛在併購者的出現，並增加併購案完成的機會。同樣的，我們在交易時間的併購宣告也沒有發現這些結果。我們的實證結果顯示，當衡量付款方式在發射關於目標公司價值以及阻止潛在競爭者出現的資訊時，併購者併購宣告的時間策略是一個很重要的考量因子。
第二篇文章探討公司治理品質對公司經理人於股票購回前自願訊息宣告行為與效果的影響。文獻中已有許多研究探討公司治理結構對公司決策行為，如盈餘管理及自願性訊息揭露的影響。然而到目前為止仍然沒有文獻研究公司治理品質對公司經理人於股票購回前，刻意釋放自願性壞訊息壓低股價的投機行為之影響。我們使用三個常用的公司治理指標，包含法人持股比例，董事會獨立性，及分析師人數等。我們發現比較好的公司治理品質將使經理人於股票購回前較不會刻意釋放自願性壞訊息以壓低股價。我們的實證結果顯示，公司治理結構於公司經理人在自願性訊息揭露的決策過程，扮演很重要的角色，經理人的投機行為會受到公司治理機制的控制。
This study contains two essays on management behavior about strategic timing of acquisition announcements and governance effect on opportunistic voluntary disclosures before repurchases.
Essay 1: Bidders’ strategic timing of acquisition announcements and the effects of payment method on target returns and competing bids
Using a sample of acquisition announcements released during trading versus nontrading hours, this study examines how the strategic timing of acquisition announcements determines the impact of the method of payment on target stock returns and competition among bidders. For overnight acquisition announcements, we find that cash payment offers positively and significantly affect acquisition premiums and target returns, yet these results do not hold for daytime announcements. Cash payment offers made during nontrading hours are more likely to deter potential bidders and complete proposed transactions. However, we find no such relationship for daytime announcements. These findings suggest that the timing of acquisition announcements by bidders is important for assessing the effects of payment method as a signal of target valuation and a preemption of competing bids.
Essay 2: The influences of corporate governance on management’s opportunistic voluntary disclosure behavior before share repurchases
We set out in this project to study the effect of corporate governance on the opportunistic management behavior in the pre-share repurchase voluntary disclosures. Prior literature has devoted considerable attention to the impact of governance structures on corporate behavior, such as earnings management and voluntarily disclosure. However, there is no existing literature investigating whether the monitoring effect of corporate governance can diminish managers’ opportunistic behavior on manipulating stock prices through voluntary disclosures before share repurchases. We examine the effect of three governance variables that are widely used in the literature: institutional ownership, board independence, and analyst coverage. We find that better corporate governance quality lowers the managerial opportunism before repurchasing shares. This is an important issue that has not been studied in the literature and our study shed light on the effect of corporate governance structure on the management voluntary disclosure decision and quality.
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