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題名：專利授權立基於交叉持股與不對稱資訊上之分析
作者：蘇菩提
作者(外文)：Su,Pu-Ti
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：經濟學系
指導教授：謝修
陳孝琪
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2011
主題關鍵詞：專利授權；單位權利金；固定權利金；交叉持股；不對稱資訊；patent licensing；cross ownership；asymmetric information；royalty；fixed fee
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本論文嘗試以不對稱資訊與交叉持股的角度，重新演繹傳統專利技術授權模型之下，獨立的專利權擁有者與被授權廠商之間的交互作用關係。
論文第二章運用賽局理論的方法，分析一個獨立的專利權擁有者，考慮以固定權利金或單位權利金的授權方式，將成本降低技術授權給兩家對稱成本的Cournot 廠商。創新的成本下降幅度大小，是專利權擁有者的私有資訊，廠商在購買之前並不知曉。本章發現在不完全資訊與非劇烈創新的假設之下，專利權擁有者採用固定權利金的授權方式時，將會只授權給一家廠商；對照此結果在完全資訊時，只會發生在劇烈性創新的假設之下。另外，本章發現即使加入了不完全資訊的設定，採用固定權利金的授權方式仍然優於單位權利金的授權方式。
論文第三章的模型設定與第二章相似，嘗試引入水平交叉持股的設定，來分析專利授權的問題。本章發現：當水平交叉持股的程度夠大時，在所有非劇烈性創新的範圍內，採單位權利金的授權方式都會優於固定權利金的授權方式。反之，當水平交叉持股的程度較小時，採用固定權利金的授權方式都會優於單位權利金的授權方式。當水平交叉持股的程度中等時，授權方式的優劣取決於創新幅度的大小。本章的結果相異於傳統文獻Kamien and Tauman (1986), and Kamien (1992)所述，為實際社會常見的單位權利金的授權方式，提供了理論性的解釋基礎。
論文第四章的模型設定與前兩章相似，嘗試引入垂直交叉持股的設定，來分析專利授權的問題。本章發現：當垂直交叉持股的的程度夠大且創新幅度夠小時，採單位權利金的授權方式會優於固定權利金的授權方式。其他範圍，則是採用固定權利金的授權方式會勝出。本章的結果，同樣為常見的單位權利金的授權方式，提供了理論性的解釋基礎。
In this dissertation, we try to revisit the traditional patent licensing issue from the perspective of incomplete information and partial cross-ownership.
In Chapter 2, we consider the fixed-fee and royalty licensing in a game-theoretical model where an independent patent holder seeks to license its cost-reducing technology to an industry with two symmetric Cournot firms. The magnitude of the cost reduction is the patent holder’s private information, which is unknown to the firms prior to licensing.
We find that under incomplete information, with fixed-fee licensing and non-drastic innovations, the patent holder may license only to one firm, which can arise as an equilibrium outcome under complete information only in the case of drastic innovation. In addition, we find that fixed-fee licensing is still superior to royalty licensing even under a scenario of incomplete information.
In Chapter 3, we consider the same traditional patent licensing model as in Chapter 2.
For any non-drastic innovation size, it is found that royalty licensing is superior to fixed-fee licensing when the degree of cross-ownership is sufficiently high. In contrast, fixed-fee licensing is preferred for a small degree of cross-ownership. In the intermediate range of cross-ownership degree, the superiority of fixed-fee and royalty licensing depends on the size of innovation. These results are different from the traditional literature studies by Kamien and Tauman (1986), and Kamien(1992) which offers a theoretical explanation for the popular usage of royalty licensing.
In Chapter 4, we analyze a patent holder’s licensing of a process innovation to a Cournot duopoly in an environment where the vertical partial cross-ownership between the patent holder and one licensee firm is considered. We find that royalty licensing is preferred when the degree of vertical cross-ownership is sufficiently high and the innovation size is small. In the remaining cases, fixed-fee licensing is preferred.
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