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題名：民間經營政府特許事業之權利金研究
作者：黃思綺
作者(外文)：Szu-Chi Huang
校院名稱：臺灣大學
系所名稱：財務金融學研究所
指導教授：李存修
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2011
主題關鍵詞：BOT；權利金；運量保證金；議價；拍賣；勾結；風險分攤；利潤分享；BOT；royalty；subsidy；bargaining；bidding；collusion；risk allocation；profit-sharing
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本論文包含兩個關於公私部門夥伴關係中權利金議題的研究子題。本論文的第一個研究子題，就是Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 計畫之利潤分享議題--權利金定價。一般咸認權利金係政府與特許廠商分享超額利潤的政策工具，在利潤分享的脈絡下，本論文首先在第二章引入資訊不對稱假設，並連結拍賣理論和議價模型，以建立權利金的定價模型。考慮實務上BOT案件先招標後議價的籌備流程，本文在第二章假設權利金是最有利標中唯一有效的評選準則，也假設權利金是唯一的議約項目；因之，最有利標就化簡成最高價標，後續的議約則化簡成單一項目議價。除了將權利金視為公共投資計畫拍賣中正的價格，本文也將政府補貼納入考慮，視補貼為負的價格；因之，第二章中的訂價模型也可延伸為政府補貼的定價模型。接下來，常見的操弄伎倆將納入此定價模型中，以討論投標廠商之間的勾結行為如何操弄權利金或補貼。討論顯示，當勾結聯盟聯合低估營運淨現金流量，以及聯合高估新建成本，將有效減少政府能收取的權利金，或有效增加政府提供的虧損補貼金額。再者，本章節將藉由分析一個火車站大樓實際案例，顯示本定價模型的應用性，並論證私人部門是如何經由勾結行為在BOT投標中獲取利益。
本論文的第二個研究子題，則是結合BOT計畫之利潤分享與風險分擔議題，將權利金和運量保證金結合，設計一個平衡機制。在第三章中，本研究設計的平衡機制將計畫風險二分為需求風險與需求以外風險，並將需求風險從全部風險中析離出來，由政府承擔；需求以外風險則轉移給私部門。執行此平衡機制，政府將需求因子作為政府的管制標的，以運量保證補貼作為風險分攤的政策工具，並以權利金作為利潤分享的政策工具，調整特許廠商的實際報酬，使政府能完全承擔需求變動的風險與利益。接著，本章節將藉由分析台北港貨櫃儲運中心案例，彰顯本機制的可操作性，也顯示本機制可應用來分析一個BOT計畫的利潤分享與風險分擔議題。為了簡化分析，本文在第三章中加入資訊對稱假設。
This dissertation is comprised of two essays on royalty under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. In the context of profit-sharing, the first essay tries to link auctions/Beauty Contests and bargaining model to price royalty under information asymmetry assumption. This essay assumes royalty is the only relevant evaluation criterion in the Beauty Contest and the sole issue of negotiation, thus reducing the Beauty Contest to a first-price sealed-bid auction and the subsequent negotiation to bargaining regarding a single issue. Royalty can then be priced using traditional auction theory combined with a classical bargaining model. Furthermore, subsidy is also considered as a negative payment of a concessionaire, thus the model can price not only royalty for a profitable project but also subsidy for an unprofitable project. Some common collusive tricks are then incorporated into the bidding and bargaining game to discuss how they manipulate the royalty or subsidy. The discussion shows that when the cartel underestimates the net operating cash flows and overestimates the construction costs, it effectively decreases the royalty received by the government or increase the loss subsidy offered by the government. Finally, this study investigates a real case to demonstrate how the model works in the real world and how the private sector profits from collusion in a BOT tender.
Next, the second essay in this dissertation aims at designing a balance mechanism between quantity-guaranteed and royalty-computed alternatives under information symmetry assumption. The balance mechanism makes a government retains demand risk but transfers the other risks to a concessionaire under a BOT scheme. Enforcing the balance mechanism between royalty-computed and quantity-guaranteed alternatives, a government adopts royalty and quantity demanded guarantee subsidy to adjust the actual returns of a concessionaire dynamically. Subsequently, a case study of the Taipei Port Container Terminal project shows that the balance mechanism has applicability to real BOT schemes and can be used to analyze both risk-sharing and profit-sharing issues under a BOT scheme.
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