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題名:台灣離岸風電專案融資道德風險管理之研究
作者:施南光 
校院名稱:逢甲大學
系所名稱:金融博士學位學程
指導教授:曾鹿鳴 博士
高承恕 博士
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2022
主題關鍵詞:道德風險 離岸風電無追索權專案融資資訊不對稱舞弊三角理論公司治理moral hazardoffshore wind powernon-recourse project financinginformation asymmetryfraud trianglecorporate governance
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融資道德風險是指借款人主觀的、惡意的違背相關法律規範與契約約定,進而造成貸款銀行巨額損失的風險。融資道德風險所帶來的負面結果可能會十分嚴重。以我國即將於2025年興建的離岸風電為例,該計畫所需投入金額將超過2兆新台幣。由於歐洲的風電業者最高僅能從歐洲出口信貸機構(ECA)取得不到貸款金額中50%的保證,而我國的國發會卻成立基金提供這些外商融資保證,讓這些外商可以在台灣投資離岸風電事業,並且僅需出資12%資金。這造成我國的金融體系將承擔高額的融資風險。
本研究以資訊不對稱理論,舞弊三角理論、以及公司治理為理論基礎,探討台灣離岸風電專案的融資道德風險管理。本研究透過個案分析法、以及深度訪談法蒐集實證資料。透過個案研究,我們發現歐洲隧道專案融資失敗原因確實是來自於大股東的道德風險。本研究進一步透過半結構式的訪談來搜集國內相關學者專家的想法及建議。
離岸風電乃我國能源政策中極為重要的一部分。本研究是國內第一個針對離岸風電的融資道德風險管理 所提出的質性研究。本研究所獲得的研究成果或許可提供研究人員、政府、與金融業一些參考。
關鍵字: 道德風險, 離岸風電, 無追索權專案融資, 資訊不對稱, 舞弊三角理論, 公司治理。  
Financing moral hazard refers to the risk that the borrowers will subjectively and maliciously violate the relevant legal norms and contracts, thereby causing the lending banks to incur substantial losses. The negative consequences of financing moral hazard can be very serious. For example, the offshore wind power project to be constructed in Taiwan in 2025 would require more than 2 trillion NT dollars in investment. The European wind power producers can only obtain less than 50% of the loan from the European Export Credit Agency (ECA), while Taiwan's National Development Council (NDC) has established a fund to ensure that the foreign wind power producers can invest in Taiwan's offshore wind power with only 12% of the capital. As a result, Taiwan's financial system will be exposed to significant financing risk.
By using information asymmetry theory, fraud triangle theory, and corporate governance theory as the theoretical underpinnings, the current study investigates the financing moral hazard management of offshore wind projects in Taiwan. Case studies and in-depth interviews are employed to gather empirical data for the study. According to the case studies, the failure of Eurotunnel funding is determined to be attributable to the moral hazard of key stockholders. This study also collects expert opinions and ideas through semi-structured interviews.
Offshore wind power is a critical part of Taiwan's energy policy. The study is Taiwan's first qualitative research of the financial moral hazard management of offshore wind projects. The findings of this study may be useful to scholars, the Taiwanese government, and the financial industry.
Keywords: moral hazard, offshore wind power, non-recourse project financing, information asymmetry, fraud triangle, corporate governance
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